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ABSTRACT 
Orbital debris is a space security problem, and the existing space debris mitigation 
framework is insufficient to achieve long-term space sustainability. Fortunately, recent 
developments in commercial space situational awareness (SSA) systems may provide an 
alternative solution. This thesis explores two research questions. First, could commercial 
SSA systems be used as a verification mechanism for space debris mitigation 
accountability? Second, how could such a verification regime lead to future enforceable 
space debris mitigation policy? To answer the first question, this thesis surveys the 
capabilities and limitations of the significant SSA technical infrastructures around the 
world. For the second research question, this thesis explores how commercial SSA 
systems could be used as a space debris verification mechanism in four possible future 
options. The four options are the status quo, international enforcement, domestic 
enforcement, and commercial best practices. This thesis concludes that commercial SSA 
systems could overcome the transparency concerns of existing government-run systems 
and that regulators should consider using commercial systems as the primary source of 
data for space debris mitigation verification. Policy and organizational changes will be 
needed to attain a verification regime that could enforce future legally binding space 
debris mitigation policies. 
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
How can commercial space situational awareness (SSA) be used as a verification 
mechanism for space debris mitigation accountability? Furthermore, how can such a 
verification regime lead to future enforceable space debris mitigation policy? 
Orbital debris is an urgent issue that threatens all users of space, and it will only get 
worse as space inevitably gets more congested. Despite this known challenge, current 
orbital debris restrictions remain voluntary. They are inadequate to solve future problems, 
and no systems or policies enforce orbital debris mitigation at either the national or 
international levels. One reason no such systems or policies exist is the lack of availability 
of high-fidelity SSA technology outside of the U.S. Department of Defense. However, the 
private sector is developing new capabilities and services that can possibly fill the 
technology gap of enforcing such a policy.  
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
Orbital debris is a space security problem, and the current framework on orbital 
debris mitigation lacks a verification regime to deal with the challenge of achieving long-
term space sustainability. Space policy expert James Clay Moltz defines space security as 
“the ability to place and operate assets outside the Earth’s atmosphere without external 
interference, damage, or destruction.”1 The United Nations Committee on the Peaceful 
Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) defines the long-term sustainability of outer space 
activities 
as the ability to maintain the conduct of space activities indefinitely into the 
future in a manner that realizes the objectives of equitable access to the 
benefits of the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes, in 
 
1 James Clay Moltz, The Politics of Space Security: Strategic Restraint and the Pursuit of National 
Interests, Third edition (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2019), 11. 
2 
order to meet the needs of the present generations while preserving the outer 
space environment for future generations.2  
Unsurprisingly, orbital debris puts space security at risk. A 2004 study concludes, 
“Continued annual growth in orbital debris populations represents a clear threat to the 
sustainability of space security over the longer term.”3 Despite this clear threat to space 
security, the current international framework on long-term space sustainability has proven 
insufficient to hold violators accountable.  
China’s 2007 anti-satellite (ASAT) test and India’s 2019 ASAT test both added a 
considerable amount of space debris without facing harsh consequences. Although 
applicable policy on orbital debris mitigation can be traced to the 1967 Outer Space Treaty 
and the 1972 Liability Convention, the first policy to specifically address orbital debris 
mitigation guidelines was NASA Management Instruction (NMI) 1700.8 in 1993 for the 
United States’ civil space program. This led to the establishment of the U.S. Government 
Orbital Debris Mitigation Standard Practices in 2001 (recently updated in 2019), which is 
applicable to U.S. civil and military space. In 2007, the United Nations adopted the Space 
Debris Mitigation Guidelines of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space on a 
non-legally binding, voluntary basis. Despite the many orbital debris mitigation policies, 
there is no accountability, and space debris continues to grow. There remains much to be 
desired for future policy that is legally binding that could address the future challenges of 
orbital debris. 
Even if an adequate policy that was legally binding was hypothetically created 
today, neither the United Nations, the United States, nor any other nation could realistically 
enforce such a policy. For many years, the only comprehensive SSA architecture was the 
United States Space Force’s Space Surveillance Network. However, the U.S. military is 
not and should not be responsible for maintaining SSA for the whole world. This is where 
commercial SSA comes in. Today, the private sector can provide accurate and 
 
2 Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of 
Outer Space, A/74/20 (New York: United Nations, 2019), 50, 
https://www.unoosa.org/res/oosadoc/data/documents/2019/a/a7420_0_html/V1906077.pdf. 
3 Simon Collard-Wexler et al., Space Security 2004 (Ontario: Spacesecurity.org, 2004), 6. 
3 
comprehensive SSA at low earth orbit (LEO). Governments that lack SSA architectures of 
their own can leverage commercial SSA services as a tool to enforce their policies.  
Much, if not all, of the academic literature on this subject agrees that orbital debris 
is a growing challenge, yet does not offer actionable solutions on how to hold violators 
accountable. This research aims to help the global community reach a solution by seriously 
considering the use of commercial SSA services as a verification mechanism. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This literature review will focus on several schools of thought of how to solve the 
debris problem. These schools of thought are scientifically led approaches, single-nation 
approaches, international approaches, and public-private approaches toward debris 
mitigation. The order is chronological in how each approach came about. Once the schools 
of thought have been characterized, the capabilities of the current technical SSA 
architecture must be analyzed to determine how commercial SAA can be applied. 
However, literature on how to use commercial SSA as a verification mechanism is 
underdeveloped, and this thesis aims to contribute toward such research.  
The scientific community plays an important role in influencing space debris 
mitigation policy, and it was the first to develop policy specific on debris mitigation. James 
Clay Moltz, who was introduced earlier, credits scientific cooperation between the United 
States and several other governments during the late 1980s for progressing orbital debris 
management in his work The Politics of Space Security. From the February 1989 “Report 
on Orbital Debris by Interagency Group (Space)” to the December U.S.-Soviet Orbital 
Debris Working Group, “this increasingly important environmental issue had finally 
emerged onto the international space agenda.” 4 Although it would be more than a decade 
for international policy to drafted and approved, NASA continued to make progress on 
their end. Jer Chyi (J.-C.) Liou is NASA’s Chief Scientist for Orbital Debris and serves as 
the Program Manager for the NASA Orbital Debris Program Office at the Johnson Space 
Center. In a 2017 presentation on orbital debris, Liou showed how the scientific community 
 
4 Moltz, The Politics of Space Security, 220. 
4 
can successfully influence policy. He noted, “NASA was the first organization in the world 
to develop orbital debris mitigation policy” with NASA Management Instruction 1700.8 
“Policy for Limiting Orbital Debris Generation” in 1993.5 NASA, with the Department of 
Defense, then established the U.S. Government (USG) Orbital Debris Mitigation Standard 
Practices, which was approved in 2001. Although the scientific community can 
successfully influence policy, it is a slow process. 
The next school of thought for debris management is a single-nation approach, 
particularly by a spacefaring nation that can serve as a model for others. No one in 
particular is promoting this unilateral approach, but this is what is actually happening, so 
it should be discussed. The United States released its first mitigation guidelines in 2001. 
Although the United States’ policies on orbital debris mitigation are stricter and more 
quantitative than its international counterparts, a single-nation approach to the debris 
problem is ineffective for solving a global problem. In an M.A. thesis titled “Dodging 
Bullets: The Threat of Space Debris to U.S. National Security” from the U.S. Army 
Command and General Staff College, Susan Ireland states, “The current [domestic] space 
debris mitigation efforts operate in this disjointed system because there is no international 
enforceable standard.”6 It would take every spacefaring nation to have and enforce its own 
strict debris mitigation policies for this approach to be successful.  
Many prominent figures in space policy call for a stronger international approach 
to solve the debris problem, but little progress has been made since 2007. There is 
consensus within the space law literature that space law has not caught up with 
technological advancement, especially when it comes to matters such as commercial space 
activities, space traffic management, and orbital debris mitigation. As discussed earlier, the 
current space debris mitigation guidelines are voluntary and not legally binding. However, 
such an international approach will be an uphill battle. The disadvantages of the 
international approach in solving the debris problem can be tied to the disadvantages of 
 
5 Jer Chyi Liou, “Orbital Debris Briefing” (Presentation, EOP/OSTP Briefing, Washington, D.C., 
December 2017), 5, https://ntrs.nasa.gov/api/citations/20170011662/downloads/20170011662.pdf. 
6 Susan Ireland, “Dodging Bullets: The Threat of Space Debris to U.S. National Security” (Master’s 
Thesis, Fort Leavenworth, KS, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2010), 40. 
5 
global institutionalism with regard to space security. Moltz states, “The disadvantages of 
the global institutionalist school are enforcement costs and the risk of free riders.”7 Just as 
the science community alone cannot establish nor enforce debris mitigation policy, the 
international community cannot enforce guidelines that are not legally binding. Getting 
nations to fund international organizations that will be required for space debris and traffic 
management will not be easy, and it will take a great deal of political will to do so. In an 
effort to provide a road map for developing future space policy, the University of 
Nebraska’s Frans von der Dunk analyzed the 1967 Outer Space Treaty and the 1972 
Liability Convention in the 2001 journal article “Space Debris and the Law.”  He proposed 
developing future law “firstly by means of ‘soft’, non-binding law such as resolutions, 
guidelines or codes of conduct which later on could develop, if of proven value and 
feasibility, into ‘hard’ law.”8 The softs laws of the 2007 UN mitigation guidelines have yet 
to evolve into hard law. In a separate analysis of the 1972 Liability Convention appearing 
in his book Crowded Orbits, Moltz assessed the guidelines as confusing and inadequate to 
deal with complex international liability issues.9 Space debris mitigation policy needs to 
be clarified so enforcement can take place.  
As far as what should happen next for an international approach, there are a variety 
of ideas from specific policies to calling for a stronger international regime. In the Chicago 
Journal of International Law, Chelsea Muñoz-Patchen suggests that the international 
community adopt a “market-share liability regime under which debris-creating nations 
fund the clean-up.”10  However, this requires strong buy-in that is not possible with current 
“soft” laws. Many experts call for a stronger international regulatory regime that could 
apply such policies. In both Crowded Orbits and The Politics of Space Security, Moltz calls 
for multilateral cooperation in space to control and eventually reduce orbital debris. Susan 
 
7 Moltz, The Politics of Space Security, 357. 
8 Frans von der Dunk, “Space Debris and the Law,” Proceedings of the Third European Conference on 
Space Debris, 19 - 21 March 2001, SP-473, 2 (March 2001): 867. 
9 James Clay Moltz, Crowded Orbits: Conflict and Cooperation in Space (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2014), 84. 
10 Chelsea Munoz-Patchen, “Regulating the Space Commons: Treating Space Debris as Abandoned 
Property in Violation of the Outer Space Treaty,” Chicago Journal of International Law 19, no. 1 (June 
2018): 28. 
6 
Ireland prescribes that “a peer-monitored space debris mitigation compliance program 
implemented within the IADC would provide better protection of U.S. national security 
interests in space,”11 and “the IADC has the necessary operational focus and expertise to 
implement a mutual evaluation compliance program for space debris mitigation.”12 This 
thesis will show how commercial SSA might be applied by international regulators to 
enforce space debris policies.  
The fourth school of thought is an increased private-public led approach. Literature 
on this subject is limited, but it was captured in Moltz’ The Politics of Space Security when 
he noted the establishment of the commercial-consortium Space Data Association in 
2009.13 Moltz also assessed that commercial SSA systems such as California-based 
LeoLabs could increase transparency, which might improve chances for collision 
avoidance, and provide data that can hold debris creating entities accountable. This thesis 
will explore this approach further.  
In conclusion, there are four school of thought when it comes to solving the space 
debris problem: scientifically led approaches, single-nation approaches, international 
approaches, and public-private approaches. There is expert consensus that the lack of law 
and policy, not technology, is holding the world back from solving the orbital debris issue. 
Also, literature that details the use of commercial SSA by regulators as an enforcement 
mechanism for space debris mitigation is under-developed, so this thesis will contribute to 
this area. Lastly, the topics of Space Situational Awareness and Space Traffic Management 
are often tied together. For the scope of this thesis, I will have to be diligent in focusing on 
orbital debris mitigation because space traffic management is a separate problem set.  
D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
There are four possible solutions that are worth exploring for how commercial SSA 
could be applied to be a verification mechanism for space debris mitigation. The four 
options are (1) continuation of the status quo, (2) international enforcement, (3) domestic 
 
11 Ireland, “Dodging Bullets,” 102. 
12 Ireland, 103. 
13 Moltz, The Politics of Space Security, 344–45. 
7 
enforcement, and (4) commercial best practices. The status quo is a weak international 
regulatory regime with the U.S. Department of Defense providing the bulk of SSA data to 
the world. The second and third possible solutions would involve governments moving 
away from the U.S. military’s SSA system and contracting commercial SSA services. This 
could be done either by contracting individual commercial SSA systems or using 
international consortiums like the Space Data Association. Commercial best practices 
would require commercial sector applying strict guidelines on themselves with the interest 
of preserving space for future use. 
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
Using a qualitative case study approach, this thesis focused on the capabilities of 
existing SSA systems and how commercial SSA can be used as a verification mechanism 
by regulators for space debris mitigation. This thesis intends to answer the research 
questions by discovering shortcomings in existing SSA systems and policy. It was 
impractical to analyze every SSA system. It was also impractical to analyze the domestic 
space debris mitigation policies of every spacefaring nation, so this thesis will only 
examine the United States’ policies in detail. This thesis only used unclassified information 
when discussing DOD SSA capabilities. When literature fell short, I consulted space policy 
experts, technical space experts, and those in the private sector. 
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II. GOVERNMENT SSA TECHNICAL INFRASTRUCTURE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will explore the capabilities and limitations of the SSA infrastructures 
operated and maintained by individual governments. Governments use SSA for various 
purposes that range from national security applications to supporting civil and commercial 
endeavors. Governments also use SSA to further international cooperation, promote space 
sustainability, and ensure safety in space. The first section will cover the capabilities, and 
the second section will cover the limitations of government SSA systems. Although the 
SSA systems are vastly different from one another, government SSA systems’ limitations 
are similar.  
B. OVERVIEW OF GOVERNMENT SSA SYSTEMS 
This section will first cover the United States Space Surveillance Network then 
foreign government SSA systems.  
1. The United States: The Space Surveillance Network  
The United States operates the largest and best overall SSA infrastructure globally 
known as the Space Surveillance Network (SSN), and the military runs it. Although the 
SSN is military in origin, the catalog of space objects maintained by the 18th Space Control 
Squadron is the most comprehensive to date. Other government agencies, foreign 
countries, the science community, academia, and commercial entities alike use the SSN as 
their primary source for SSA data. For example, NASA uses SSN data as the source for 
the Conjunction Assessment and Risk Analyses (CARA) program for monitoring potential 
collision threats for civil and participating commercial customers.14 Many others in the 
space community have relied on this data since the DOD’s data-sharing program began in 
2010 in response to the 2009 debris-generating satellite collision between an active 
commercial Iridium satellite and a non-functional Russian satellite.  
 
14 “Satellite Safety,” National Aeronautics and Space Administration, accessed January 18, 2021, 
https://satellitesafety.gsfc.nasa.gov/cara.html. 
10 
The 18th Space Control Squadron (18th SCS) operates the SSN in Vandenberg, 
California, which falls under the United States Space Force’s (USSF) Space Delta 2 in 
Colorado Springs, Colorado. Headquartered at Peterson Air Force Base, the mission of 
Space Delta 2 is “to prepare, present and, if necessary, fight to protect and defend the U.S. 
and our allies from attack in, through and from space.”15 Headquartered at Vandenberg Air 
Force Base, the 18th Space Control Squadron’s stated mission is to “defend freedom of 
action in space for the Joint Force, multinational partners and humanity.”16 The 18th SCS   
is tasked with providing 24/7 support to the space surveillance network 
(SSN), maintaining the space catalog, and managing United States Space 
Command’s (USSPACECOM) space situational awareness (SSA) sharing 
program to the United States, foreign government, and commercial 
entities.17  
The 18th SCS is co-located with the Combined Space Operations Center (CSpOC,) which 
falls under Space Delta 5. The CSpOC hosts international exchange officers and “a 
Commercial Integration Cell representative to enhance cooperation” and information 
exchange with allies and commercial partners.18  
The SSN is a global network comprised of various sensors to include more than 30 
radar, optical, and space-based assets that detect, track, and characterize space objects 
larger than 10 cm from LEO to GEO. Figure 1 shows the layout of SSN sensors by location 
and type. The sensor categories are further divided into three categories: dedicated, 
collateral, and contributing.19 Dedicated sensors’ primary mission, such as the Space 
Fence, is SSA. International partners also contribute dedicated sensors as well. For 
 
15 “Space Delta 2 Fact Sheet” (United States Space Force, 2020), 
https://www.peterson.spaceforce.mil/Units/SPACE-DELTA-2/. 
16 United States Space Force, “18th Space Control Squadron Fact Sheet” (United States Space Force, 
2021), https://www.peterson.spaceforce.mil/About/Fact-Sheets/Display/Article/2356622/18th-space-
control-squadron/. 
17 United States Space Force. 
18 “Combined Space Operations Center / Space Delta 5 Fact Sheet” (United States Space Force), 
accessed January 14, 2021, https://www.vandenberg.spaceforce.mil/Portals/18/documents/CFSCC/CSpOC-
Delta5-FactSheet.pdf?ver=2020-07-23-181257-343. 
19 Craig Boucher, “Lesson 5- Space Situational Awareness” (Presentation, lecture, Naval Postgraduate 
School, Monterey, California, October 19, 2020), 10. 
11 
example, the United Kingdom contributes ground-based radars, and Canada operates the 
space-based Sapphire, which both are part of the SSN. Collateral sensors such as COBRA 
DANE primarily conduct missile warning but can also be used for SSA. Contributing 
sensors are typically non-DOD R&D assets under contract with the USSF. An additional 
SSA data source comes from civil and commercial satellite operators themselves. In 
summary, not every asset part of the SSN primarily conducts SSA all the time. The 
architecture as a whole takes between 380,000 to 420,000 observations a day,20 and it 
maintains a catalog of over 22,000 objects over 10 cm at various orbits, 13,000 of which 
are debris.21 However, these statistics do not yet include the newest addition of the Space 
Fence nor the Space Surveillance Telescope (SST), which will add a significant overall 
architecture capability.  
 
Figure 1. SSN Sensor Types and Locations.22 
 
20 Bhavya Lal et al., Global Trends in Space Situational Awareness (SSA) and Space Traffic 
Management (STM), D-9074 (Science and Technology Policy Institute, 2018), A-2, https://www.ida.org/-
/media/feature/publications/g/gl/global-trends-in-space-situational-awareness-ssa-and-space-traffic-
management-stm/d-9074.ashx.  
21 “Box Score,” 18th Space Control Squadron, accessed January 15, 2021, https://www.space-
track.org/#boxscore. 
22 Source: Boucher, “SSA,” 9. 
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To date, it is not clear the Space Fence is contributing to the public catalog, so its 
capabilities will be examined to see how it will likely enhance the SSN. Located on 
Kwajalein Atoll, the AN/FSY-3 Space Fence Radar was declared operational in March 
2020,23 but little information has been made public. The Space Fence uses a solid-state S-
band phased array radar designed to provide unqueued assured coverage in LEO and 
provide queued support of GEO.24 The higher S-band frequency will allow the Space Fence 
to achieve higher resolutions than the current SSN radars, which use lower frequencies. 
More specifically, unclassified acquisition documents from 2016 show that both the 
threshold and objective requirements for the Space Fence for minimal detection size was 
10 cm at orbital altitudes between 250 km - 2000 km and 20 cm between 2000 km - 3000 
km.25 However, the USSF reports the Space Fence can detect and track nano-satellites and 
debris less than 10 cm at unspecified orbits.26 Space operations expert Brian Weeden 
expects that the Space Fence will track objects as small as 5 cm at GEO.27 The Space Fence 
will also use a technique called Digital Beam Forming (DBF) that is capable of maintaining 
persistent surveillance while tracking hundreds of objects simultaneously within the radar’s 
field of view.28 Once relevant technical details are made public, further analysis can be 
made on the Space Fence’s specific capabilities. Until then, it is reasonable to assume, 
based on the available information, that the Space Fence will significantly enhance the 
SSN’s capability to detect, track, and characterize space objects and orbital debris, which 
will be invaluable for the future of space safety and sustainability.  
 
23 Sandra Erwin, “Space Fence Surveillance Radar Site Declared Operational,” SpaceNews, March 28, 
2020, https://spacenews.com/space-fence-surveillance-radar-site-declared-operational/. 
24 G. Fonder et al., “Space Fence Radar Overview,” in 2019 International Applied Computational 
Electromagnetics Society Symposium (ACES) (Miami, 2019), 1–3. 
25 Dana Whalley, Space Fence Ground-Based Radar System Increment 1 (Space Fence Inc 1), DD-
A&T(Q&A)823-438 (Hanscom Air Force Base, MA: United States Air Force, 2015). 
26 Erica Blanton, “Swinging for the Space Fence,” United States Space Force, April 7, 2020, 
https://www.spaceforce.mil/News/Article/2142648/swinging-for-the-space-fence. 
27 Brian Weeden, “US Policy and Capabilities on SSA” (Presentation, Seoul, South Korea, January 24, 
2019), 5. 
28 Fonder et al., “Space Fence Radar Overview,” 1. 
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Just as important as having the sensors to collect data, the capability to process the 
data is crucial to getting the right information to the right decision-maker at the right time. 
The 18th Space Control Squadron uses the catalog maintenance cycle to collect, validate, 
and update observations to task appropriate sensors for follow-on observations.29 There are 
three systems that process collected data and maintain the catalog. First, the Space Defense 
Operations Center (SPADOC) uses a 1980s era IBM 3090 mainframe to maintain the 
catalog. SPADOC maintains the current general perturbations (G.P.) and extrapolated 
general perturbations (eGP) catalog for all objects with a calculation precision of up to 
seven significant digits.30 The second system is from the year 2000, and it is called the 
Correlation, Analysis, and Verification of Ephemerides Network (CAVENet), which 
includes the Astrodynamics Support Workstation (ASW). More simply, known as 
CAVENet/ASW, it maintains the historical continuity files of space objects and has a 
calculation precision of up to 16 significant digits. It uses special perturbations (S.P.), 
which consider higher-order force models for more accurate processing.31 Both SPADOC 
and CAVENet/ASW only process organic SSN data, and both use batch weighted least 
squares as the processing method. This method requires that the data be processed in 
batches, which is generally more timely than other processing methods such as Kalman 
filtering, which relies on timely updates. The third system is Non-traditional Data Pre-
Processor (NDPP), which allows the 18th SCS to incorporate data from commercial and 
foreign government entities. The public users’ result is the Satellite Catalog (SATCAT), 
which is available to all on www.space-track.org. However, this catalog only includes two-
line elements (TLE) for space objects’ positional data. The covariance data required for 
higher levels of analysis are not included, which may not be helpful in the space 
community.  
In addition to providing data supporting the DOD and other U.S. government 
applications, the DOD offers services and products that promote spaceflight safety and 
debris mitigation to the public at no cost. There are three categories that are part of the SSA 
 
29 Boucher, “SSA,” 7. 
30 Boucher, 19. 
31 Boucher, 19. 
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Sharing Program: Basic Services, Emergency Services, and Advanced Services.32 Basic 
Services are available to the public through www.space-track.org, where registered users 
have access to the SATCAT, general perturbation positional data for the unclassified space 
catalog, satellite decay, and reentry predictions. The second category, Emergency Services, 
is offered to satellite operators or customers with specific needs. These users have access 
to anomaly resolution, basic emergency conjunction assessments, and basic emergency 
collision avoidance services. Access to Emergency Services requires customers to register 
their satellite or payload with the 18th SCS. The final category, Advanced Services, requires 
an SSA Sharing Agreement with USSPACECOM. Those with an SSA Sharing Agreement 
have access to various additional services such as launch support, end-of-life/disposal, and 
reentry. Figure 2 shows the number of Sharing Agreements increase over time. Access to 
Advanced Services requires a more formal application process. However, it is still 
available for all domestic and foreign space community members to include satellite 
operators, commercial entities, and even research/academic institutions.  
 
Figure 2. Sharing Agreements with USSPACECOM by Organization 
Type.33 
 
32 Clinton Crosier, “United States Strategic Command Space Situational Awareness Sharing Program 
Update” (Presentation, Vienna, Austria, February 3, 2016), 4. 
33 Source: Lal et al., Global Trends, 49. 
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2. Foreign Government SSA Systems 
No other individual government SSA system comes close to the capabilities and 
public data sharing products offered by the United States. Even foreign militaries with SSA 
sensors use their data to augment data from the United States. This section will give a brief 
overview of foreign systems and emerging trends in Russia, Asia, and Europe since these 
regions have the next most mature SSA infrastructures.  
Russia’s Space Surveillance System (SSS) is the second-largest network of SSA 
sensors globally, and it is primarily used for national security purposes, which is not helpful 
for space debris mitigation efforts. Technical information on the SSS is scarce, but it 
consists of traditional radars, phased array radars, electro-optical sensors, and LIDAR 
(light detection and ranging) sensors.34 Operated by the Russian military, the sensors are 
located throughout Russia and the former Soviet republics through bilateral agreements.35 
Although Russia maintains a catalog that competes with that of the United States 
concerning its completeness, the SSS is primarily used for national security purposes. It 
does not share data as openly as the United States. This is not to say Russia does not share 
data with the international community. Russia collaborates with the international 
community through the International Scientific Optical Network (ISON), which will be 
covered in the next section.  
In Asia, Japan is increasing its investment in SSA. Japan’s existing SSA 
architecture is less capable than that of the United States. Still, it is actively involved in 
independently maintaining a space catalog and analyzing TLE data from the SSN through 
a Sharing Agreement. Japan is in the process of upgrading its sensor network as part of its 
2018 Space Act. The Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) plans to develop a new 
radar to increase the resolution of 1.6 m at LEO of the current system to 10 cm at LEO and 
refurbish existing ground-based electro-optical sensors and restructure its analysis system 
 
34 “Russian Space Surveillance System (RSSS),” Global Security, accessed January 12, 2021, 
https://www.globalsecurity.org/space/world/russia/space-surveillance.htm. 
35 Brian Weeden, “Space Situational Awareness Fact Sheet” (Secure World Foundation, 2017), 
https://swfound.org/media/205874/swf_ssa_fact_sheet.pdf. 
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to enhance data processing and conjunction assessments.36 This new system will integrate 
with the Ministry of Defense’s operating system per the concept of operations in Figure 3. 
Despite these upgrades, Japan will still need to rely on the SSN or other SSA sources 
because of its lack of global coverage.  
 
Figure 3. Japan’s SSA Concept of Operations.37 
Other key countries with SSA capabilities in the Asia and Pacific include China, 
South Korea, Australia, and India. China’s “Purple Mountain Observatory is operating 
telescopes in at least four locations” across China, and they have ship-based SSA used 
during new satellite launches and military purposes.38 Not much else is publicly known 
about the Chinese government’s SSA capabilities. However, China is heavily involved 
with the international scientific community as the leader of the Asia-Pacific Ground-Based 
optical Space Objects Observation System (APOSOS). Since this is an international 
 
36 Susumu Yoshitimi, “SSA Capabilities and Policies in Japan” (Presentation, The K Hotel, Seoul, 
South Korea, January 24, 2019), 10, https://swfound.org/media/206349/susumu-yoshitomi-ssa-workshop-
in-seoul-20190124.pdf. 
37 Source: Yoshitimi, 18. 
38 Lal et al., Global Trends, 29. 
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scientific architecture, APOSOS will be discussed in the next chapter. China does not have 
a Sharing Agreement with the United States, whereas South Korea, Australia, and India 
do. South Korea primarily uses its five optical sensors for national security purposes, but 
they are still reliant on outside data.39 Australia uses SSA mostly for international 
collaboration, but they have an extensive partnership with the U.S. military. Australia 
operates one optical sensor, one radar, and one laser-ranging sensor. Australia’s military 
processes SSA data at its Australian Space Operations Center in addition to using data from 
the U.S. The Australian military will also operate the United States’ Space Surveillance 
Telescope, which is expected to enter service in 2022.40 Lastly, India operates two SSA 
radars to support domestic space launches and recently signed a Data Sharing agreement 
with the United States on October 27, 2020.41  
In Europe, several countries operate individual SSA sensors. The “United Kingdom 
and Norway operate radar systems that are part of the United States’ SSN.”42 France and 
Germany have radar SSA systems primarily for national security. Spain operates a radar 
sensor, and Italy operates two optical sensors primarily for international cooperation.43 
Individual European countries do not operate SSA systems that are as robust as the United 
States because it is not economical. Instead, there is either a reliance on SSN data or 
European countries form a multinational SSA system such as the European Space 
Agency’s SSA Program.  
For other countries around the world, Table 1 summarizes where foreign 
government SSA systems “stand in terms of data collection, data processing, and data 
products,” as assessed by the 2018 “Global Trends” report.44  
 
39 Lal et al., D-2. 
40 Sandra Erwin, “U.S. Space Force Deploying Surveillance Telescope in Australia,” SpaceNews, 
April 23, 2020, https://spacenews.com/u-s-space-force-deploying-surveillance-telescope-in-australia/. 
41 Vivek Raghuvanshi, “India, U.S. Sign Intel-Sharing Agreement Amid Tension with Neighboring 
China,” DefenseNews, October 28, 2020, https://www.defensenews.com/space/2020/10/28/india-us-sign-
intel-sharing-agreement-amid-tension-with-neighboring-china/. 
42 Lal et al., Global Trends, 33. 
43 Lal et al., D-3. 
44 Lal et al., 52. 
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Table 1. Country Technology Maturity Matrix.45 
 




45 Source: Lal et al., 52. 
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Even though individual governments’ SSA capabilities differ, they share many of 
the same limitations, such as lack of coverage, lack of transparency, and not meeting the 
needs of regulators and the commercial sector. The SSN, with its ground sensors spread 
across the globe and sensors in space, still has gaps in coverage. The coverage gaps are 
especially apparent in parts of Asia, Africa, and South America.46 The second limitation is 
transparency. Many government SSA systems are tied to national security, and their leaders 
are reluctant to share their data. The lack of transparency unavoidably leads to some level 
of distrust, which has caused some countries to pursue self-reliance. Third, governments 
cannot meet all of the needs of the space community. For example, the DOD’s services are 
a one-size-fits-all approach that cannot meet everyone’s needs. Related to the transparency 
issue, the DOD’s TLE-based catalog is not useful for higher levels of analysis because 
covariance data is not made public. Not meeting the space community’s needs is partly 
because the primary purpose of the SSN is for national security, not civil and commercial 
space traffic management and sustainability. It is impractical and doubtful that an 
individual government’s SSA system will be everything for everyone, regulators included. 
 
46 Weeden, “US Policy and Capabilities on SSA,” 7. 
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These limitations have paved the way for nations forming multinational SSA organizations 
like the International Scientific Optical Network (ISON) or created an industry for 
commercial SSA.  
D. CONCLUSION 
As far as individual governments, the United States and Russia have the most 
capable SSA systems in the world. However, individual government SSA systems are 
generally limited by coverage gaps, lack transparency, and are unable to meet the global 
space community’s needs. Therefore, government SSA systems may not be the best answer 
for serving as a verification mechanism for orbital debris mitigation. As we will see in the 
next two chapters, multinational and commercial SSA may be better suited to overcome 
these limitations.  
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III. INTERNATIONAL AND SCIENTIFIC COMMUNITY 
TECHNICAL INFRASTRUCTURE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In an effort to either establish independence from the United States or increase 
international cooperation, many countries have formed bilateral and multilateral 
partnerships to create their own SSA networks. Some of these partnerships come in the 
form of the international scientific community banding together. Others come in the form 
of regional political relationships. The clear advantage of both international political and 
scientific partnerships is burden-sharing, which overcomes the limitation of individual-
government SSA architectures that do not find it practical or affordable to create their own 
global systems. 
B. OVERVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL AND SCIENTIFIC COMMUNITY 
SSA SYSTEMS 
This section will discuss major non-commercial international and scientific 
community SSA systems. Some SSA systems are global and some are regional.  
1. International Scientific Optical Network (ISON) 
While the Russian military’s Space Surveillance System is secretive, Russia is a 
leader in international cooperation through the International Scientific Optical Network 
(ISON). ISON started in 2004 as a voluntary international project for scientific and 
academic institutions to develop “an independent open source of data for scientific analysis 
and spacecraft operators.”47 As its name suggests, it operates a network of optical sensors 
only. As of 2019, ISON collected measurements from 43 observation facilities with access 
to more than 100 telescopes in 17 countries across the globe.48  
 
47 I. Molotov et al., “ISON Network Tracking of Space Debris: Current Status and Achievements,” in 
Revista Mexicana de Astronomía y Astrofísica Serie de Conferencias, vol. 51 (Huelva, 2017), 145, 
https://doi.org/10.22201/ia.14052059p.2019.51.25. 
48 Molotov et al., 144. 
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ISON is organized by the Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS) in Moscow, and it 
is organized into three segments. Each segment has its own scheduling center and sources 
of finance. First, the Keldysh Institute of Applied Mathematics (KIAM)49 coordinates 
ISON’s activities, processes collected measurements, and provides various space 
operations services. The second segment is called Roscosmos. More accurately, the second 
segment is KIAM’s support to Roscosmos. The KIAM supports Roscosmos with its daily 
operations and conjunction warnings. The third is Vimpel, which is commercial-oriented. 
Altogether, these three segments make up ISON.  
ISON has partners across the globe with varying levels of cooperation. According 
to a February 2020 presentation from the KIAM RAS’ Igor Molotov to COPUOS, there 
are three broad levels of cooperation with ISON: international cooperation, informal 
collaboration, and cooperation of observatories.50 Organizations part of the international 
cooperation include the Zimmerwald Observatory in Switzerland, the Barcelona 
Observatory in Spain, and the Cosala Observatory in Mexico. ISON also collaborates 
informally with NASA’s Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) in the United States. The 
cooperation of observatories category included observatories from Georgia, Bulgaria, and 
Kazakhstan. Figure 4 depicts the locations of ISON’s telescopes and observatories around 
the world.  
International cooperation is expected to grow through the UN’s access to Space for 
All Initiative, a partnership between ISON and the United Nations Office for Outer Space 
Affairs (UNOOSA). Announced in January 2020, UNOOSA and KIAM RAS planned to 
offer select academic and research institutions in developing countries 20 cm aperture 
telescopes and training on using them.51 The Access to Space for All Initiative aims to 
share technology and grow ISON. The applications for these two opportunities to receive 
 
49 The KIAM  is also often referred to as KIAM RAS. 
50 Igor Molotov, “International Cooperation in Field of Observations of the Near-Earth Objects Within 
ISON Project” (Presentation, Fifty-seventh session of Scientific and Technical Subcommittee COPUOS, 
Vienna, February 3, 2020), 4. 




the telescopes and training are open until July 2021. The winners will be selected in 
October 2021.  
 
Figure 4. ISON Telescopes and Observatories52 
A variety of telescopes contribute SSA data to ISON. Of the over 100 telescopes 
that are part of ISON, details for only about half are publicly available. ISON’s sensors 
include: 30 telescopes with 20 cm to 40 cm apertures, 12 telescopes with 50 cm to 80 cm 
apertures, and 10 telescopes with 60 cm to 2.6 m apertures.53 ISON conducts six types of 
observations: 
1. Standard GEO survey with 22 to 25 cm telescopes  
2. Extended GEO survey with 18 to 19.2 cm telescopes 
3. Deep GEO survey with 50 to 75 cm telescopes 
4. Bright GEO and HEO objects with 25 cm telescopes 
5. Faint space debris at GEO with 40 to 80 cm telescopes 
 
52 Source: Molotov, “International Cooperation in Field of Observations of the Near-Earth Objects 
Within ISON Project,” 3. 
53 Molotov, 2. 
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6. Photometry observations of asteroids with 40 cm to 2.6 m telescopes54 
In 2017, the telescope network collected 20.048 million measurements and cataloged 6,740 
objects.55 This catalog is much smaller than the United States’ SATCAT because ISON’s 
catalog primarily accounts for GEO and HEO orbits. However, ISON collected data on 
2,863 objects that are not in the SATCAT and do not have TLE information.56 The numbers 
of measurements and objects are expected to grow as ISON continues to mature and add 
new sensors.  
While data is collected globally, it is processed and analyzed by the KIAM. The 
RAS established the Center on Collection, Processing, and Analysis of Information on 
Space Debris (CCPAISD) at the KIAM. The CCPAISD schedules ISON’s sensors, 
processes raw measurements, and maintains ISON’s master database of space objects. As 
mentioned, the CCPAISD’s catalog focuses its analysis primarily on objects in GEO and 
HEO.57 The catalog is available on the website spacedata.vimpel.ru. The KIAM provides 
products in the following fields: 
1. Estimation of real population of space debris at high geocentric 
orbits 
2. Determination of physical properties of discovered space debris 
objects 
3. Determination of probable sources of newly discovered space debris 
fragments 
4. Verification of existing evolution models of space debris 
distribution 
5. High orbit space debris risk assessment 
6. Improvement of technologies of studying of space debris population 
using optical instruments 
7. Improvement of motion models for space debris objects with 
complex physical properties58 
 
54 “ISON Network Tracking of Space Debris,” 147.; Molotov, “International Cooperation in Field of 
Observations of the Near-Earth Objects Within ISON Project.” 
55 Molotov et al., “ISON Network Tracking of Space Debris,” 147. 
56 Molotov et al., 147. 
57 Molotov et al., 145. 
58 Molotov et al., 147. 
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The KIAM also provides services dedicated to Roscosmos. Using ISON data, the joint 
Roscosmos and KIAM project “Automated System for Prediction and Warning on the 
hazardous situations in the near-Earth space” (ASPOS OKP) provides conjunction analysis 
and support for daily operations for Russian satellite operators.59  
 For future development, ISON intends to increase international cooperation 
through its partnership with the United Nations. As for data processing, ISON plans to 
improve its software.60  In 2017, the Secure World Foundation determined that ISON had 
grown closer to the Russian government.61 Russia’s skeptics may be concerned about 
transparency with the Russian government’s growing involvement in ISON.  
2. Europe 
Europe has two major international SSA systems. The European Space Agency 
Space Situational Awareness Program (ESA SSA) and the European Union Space and 
Surveillance and Tracking Framework (EU SST) are distinct regional efforts in 
coordinating SSA. They are distinctive because the members of ESA and the EU are not 
the same, and their systems serve different purposes. ESA SSA primarily focuses on 
science and research, while the EU SST focuses on security. 
a. European Space Agency SSA Program (ESA SSA)  
ESA SSA Program’s organization is spread across Europe, and its SSA is organized 
by function. ESA SSA was established in 2009 as an independent SSA capability. While 
ESA is headquartered in Paris, France, the SSA Program Office is located at the European 
Space Operations Center (ESOC) in Darmstadt, Germany. Teams across ESA conduct 
technology research and development, project planning, and industrial contracting.62 As 
shown in Table 2, 19 states participate in ESA SSA as of 2021. Participation by country 
varies over time and ranges from contributing financially to contributing SSA sensors. ESA 
 
59 Molotov et al., 145. 
60 Molotov et al., 149. 
61 Weeden, “Space Situational Awareness Fact Sheet,” 3. 
62 “SSA Programme Overview,” The European Space Agency, accessed February 7, 2021, 
https://www.esa.int/Safety_Security/SSA_Programme_overview. 
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practices geo-return as an equitable means of return on investment from member states. 
Space policy researcher Patricia McCormick stated, “Geo-return is a central component in 
the relationship and exchange between ESA and its member states.”63 Functionally, ESA 
SSA is organized into “three main areas: Space Weather (SWE), Near-Earth Objects 
(NEO), and Space Surveillance and Tracking (SST).”64 The SST segment is most relevant 
to orbital debris, and it is not to be confused with the EU SST. 
Table 2. ESA Member States Participating in SSA65 
 
 
While ESA SSA’s sensors are regional, ESA has partners across the globe. Some 
of ESA’s major partners in SSA data sharing and international cooperation are: 
• The United States (2014 SSA Sharing Agreement with the DOD)  
• South Korea 
• The European Union 
• Inter-Agency Debris Coordination Committee (IADC) 
• European Organization for Astronomical Research in the Southern 
Hemisphere (ESO) 
 
63 Patricia McCormick, “Space Situational Awareness in Europe: The Fractures and the Federative 
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• United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space – 
Scientific and Technical Subcommittee (UNCOPUOS-STSC)66 
ESA SSA’s sensors fall under Space Surveillance and Tracking (SST) segment, but 
the sensors’ technical specifications are vague. ESA defines its SST segment as “watching 
for active and inactive satellites, discarded launch stages, and fragmentation debris orbiting 
Earth” and “the ability to detect and predict the movement of space debris in orbit around 
Earth.”67 The sensors are comprised of radar, laser, and optical capabilities. However, 
details on the capabilities and how each sensor contributes to the network are lacking, likely 
due to the sensors’ close ties to national security. Even in ESA’s 2020 Annual Space 
Environment Report, the primary data sources were from the United States SSN and 
Russia’s KIAM.68 Not one organic ESA sensor was listed as a data source for the report. 
Sensor sources are likely protected due to connections to the sensors being tied to systems 
used for national security purposes. This is likely why ESA focuses its endeavors more on 
the space weather and near-earth objects segments.  
ESA maintains the Database and Information System Characterizing Objects in 
Space (DISCOS) to catalog space objects. The ESOC in Darmstadt, Germany, oversees 
DISCOS’ operations. The database “is a single-source reference” for all unclassified 
trackable objects that allows ESA to provide support in collision avoidance, re-entry 
analysis, and contingency support.69 Over 40,000 objects are cataloged.70 DISCOSweb is 
a web-based catalog that can be accessed by space operators at discosweb.esoc.esa.int. A 
2017 upgrade allowed DISCOS to link fragments and debris to parent objects, which could 
 
66 The European Space Agency. 
67 The European Space Agency. 
68 European Space Agency, ESA’s Annual Space Environment Report, GEN-DB-LOG-00288-OPS-SD 
(Germany: European Space Agency, 2020), 6, 
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be useful for enforcing future orbital debris mitigation regulations.71 The upgrade also 
promises that new data sources can be incorporated with ease in a coherent interface.72 One 
of the most significant products of DISCOS is ESA’s Annual Space Environment Report. 
This report describes the space environment and details trends in compliance and non-
compliance with the United Nations’ Long-term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities.73 
While ESA lacks enforcement mechanisms, ESA can provide the appropriate data to 
regulatory bodies.  
b. European Union Space Surveillance and Tracking (EU SST) 
The European Union Space Surveillance and Tracking (EU SST) was established 
by the European Union in 2014 and became operational in 2016. “The EU SST framework 
is built on a unique, member state-led governance model” where EU member states 
cooperate with the EU Satellite Center to network existing SSA sensors, operations centers, 
and data processing capabilities.74 The original members include France, Germany, Italy, 
Spain, and the United Kingdom. In 2018, the EU SST added Poland, Portugal, and 
Romania.  
While ESA focuses on science and research, the EU’s goal was “to develop a 
European capability to protect European space assets.”75 Although the “EU SST is a 
civilian framework, it systematically integrates and leverages military, civil, and civil-
military contributions” to preserve EU security interests.76 In a 2013 decision, the European 
Commission concluded, “The European [Union] SST service has a security dimension 
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which the EU, unlike ESA, has the competence and [equipment] to deal with.”77 The 
European Commission went on to say, “The EU does not seek to supplant SSA initiatives 
undertaken by individual member states or collectively by ESA, but to complement such 
actions and reinforce coordination were deemed essential to secure common objectives.”78 
The EU SST model allows its members to balance national security and data sharing in 
ways international scientific SSA organizations inherently cannot.  
A variety of sensors around the globe contribute toward the EU SST. The sensors 
are provided, operated, and maintained by individual member states. The sensors track 
space objects at LEO, MEO, GEO, and HEO. The sensor network includes 51 sensors, of 
which 13 are radars, 34 are telescopes, and four are laser-ranging stations.79 Figure 5 is a 
map of existing EU SST sensors. The sensor variety and geographic diversity give the EU 
SST advantages of general global coverage. Still, the radars are concentrated only in 
Europe, which leads to gaps in timeliness if the EU were to rely on organic sensors alone. 
Information on specific sensor capabilities is scarce, and there is no evidence to suggest 
the EU SST is more capable than the United States SSN. Unfortunately, per the EU, “The 
SST Support Program shall not provide support for the development of new SST sensors.” 
Therefore, there is little financial incentive to upgrade or add new sensors.80 
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Figure 5. EU SST Sensors Network81 
EU member states process and feed data into the EU SST Database. The EU SST 
Database came into operation in 2019, and Germany is responsible for hosting the database. 
Under the EU SST framework, member states operate sensors and process data at the 
national level through various national operations centers before data reaches the EU SST 
Database.82 The EU SST Database can be accessed by creating an account for the EU SST 
Service Provision Portal, which can be found at sst.satcen.europa.eu. The online portal 
manages sensor tasking and service requests. In addition to the EU SST Database, the EU 
SST is developing the European SST Catalog. Once online, the future SST Catalog will 
process data independently from the national operations centers and be the basis for SST 
services.83  
The EU SST provides three distinct SSA services for its approved users. First, the 
“Collision Avoidance service provides risk assessment of collision between spacecraft and 
between spacecraft and debris.”84 Second, “the Re-entry Analysis (RE) service provides 
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risk assessment of the uncontrolled re-entry of manmade space objects into the atmosphere 
that may constitute a potential risk to the safety of EU citizens and to terrestrial 
infrastructure.”85 Third, “the Fragmentation Analysis (FG) service provides detection and 
characterization of in-orbit fragmentations.”86 France and Spain are responsible for the 
Collision Avoidance service, and Italy is responsible for the Re-entry Analysis and 
Fragmentation Analysis services. Over 90 organizations are receiving these services, and 
the EU SST safeguards over 140 European satellites through these services.87  
The EU SST is well equipped to be an enforcement mechanism for space debris 
mitigation. In January 2020, EU Commissioner Thierry Breton stated the EU SST should 
explicitly be understood as the “precursor of a European Space Traffic Management [STM] 
system.”88  With this, European space policy experts Marc Becker and Pascal Faucher 
suggest this approach resonates with the United States handing over STM services from 
the U.S. Department of Defense to the Department of Commerce via the 2018 Space Policy 
Directive 3. Becker and Pascal also suggest that the “EU SST provides the operational 
capabilities and services needed to underpin future STM efforts,” such as “verifying 
compliance with norms and regulations.”89  
3. Asia-Pacific Ground-Based Optical Space Object Observation System 
(APOSOS) 
The Chinese-led Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organization (APSCO) initiated 
the Asia-Pacific Ground-Based Optical Space Object Observation System (APOSOS) in 
2016. APSCO is an international cooperative project, and APOSOS is a multinational 
electro-optical based SSA system. APSCO is headquartered in Beijing, China, and includes 
eight members. The member states are Bangladesh, China, Iran, Mongolia, Pakistan, Peru, 
Thailand, and Turkey. Indonesia and Mexico are listed separately as a signatory state and 
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an observer state, respectively.90 The member states believe international “collaboration 
and cooperation are effective approaches to promote science and technology.”91 APSCO 
“has formal rules and requires that its members pay dues.”92 Additionally, APSCO has a 
cooperative relationship with the United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs. APSCO’s 
goals with APOSOS are to build a cost-effective telescope observation network, “acquire 
accurate astrometric measurements of space objects, and encourage scientific exchanges in 
space debris research.”93 
APOSOS’ primary sensor is a 15 cm aperture electro-optical telescope. Although 
there are eight member states, only three of the member states host telescopes so far. The 
member states with telescopes are Pakistan, Peru, and Iran. APSCO chose the sites based 
on environment and infrastructure assessments.94 The 15 cm aperture was chosen as a 
balance of cost and performance. The electro-optical telescopes are custom designed to 
meet APSCO’s needs, and they are integrated and built by the Chinese Academy of 
Sciences.95 “Each APOSOS telescope, as an integrated system of hardware and software, 
costs $180,000,” and is capable of detecting 10 cm objects at LEO and 1 m objects in 
GEO.96 The telescopes are also capable of tracking space objects at MEO and HEO at 
unspecified resolutions. The goal of APOSOS is to build more observation nodes with 
telescopes around the world for global coverage. 
Data processing occurs at the Data and Operation Management Center located at 
the National Astronomical Observatory, Chinese Academy of Sciences in Beijing, China. 
The Data and Operation Management Center is responsible for network coordination, 
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observation schedules, data processing, and orbit determination.97APOSOS primarily uses 
TLE data for processing “because of its commons usage in the scientific community and 
public accessibility.”98 APOSOS is mainly in a training and experimentation phase, and it 
is unclear exactly what SSA services and products are offered to APSCO members.99  
C. LIMITATIONS 
In general, the limitations of international and scientific community SSA systems 
are due to the regional nature of the architecture, technical challenges, and lack of 
transparency. Some of the major international SSA systems, such as the EU SST, are 
regionally focused on the services and products provided. Some, like ESA SSA, are 
regional in sensor placement. APOSOS, on the other hand, only has three electro-optical 
sensors around the world but is regionally focused, with the exception of Peru.  
All of the international SSA systems discussed face some sort of technical 
limitation that prevent them from achieving comprehensive coverage. ISON and APOSOS 
only use electro-optical sensors. The EU SST’s radars are only in Europe. ESA SSA’s 
organic sensors are located in Europe. These technical challenges prevent these SSA 
systems from being independent SSA architectures. There is still a heavy reliance on the 
United States SSN.  
Despite efforts in international collaboration and burden sharing, some 
international and scientific community SSA systems still suffer from a lack of 
transparency, and some even suffer from mistrust. A few interviewees in the study titled 
“Global Trends in Space Situational Awareness and Space Traffic Management” compared 
the EU SST’s lack of transparency of data to the United States SSN.100 In the same study, 
interviewees cited geopolitical issues between China and Japan that will likely limit the 
extent of regional SSA efforts in the case of APOSOS.101 Altogether, the limitations of 
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international and scientific community SSA systems give plenty of opportunities for 
commercial SSA.  
D. CONCLUSION 
International and scientific community SSA systems do not quite overcome the 
limitations of individual-government SSA systems, but they may be better suited to serve 
as a verification mechanism for orbital debris. Cooperation and burden-sharing prevent the 
need for individual countries to create their own global SSA systems and builds mutual 
trust between participating members. In particular, the EU SST may be a model for serving 
as a verification mechanism for orbital debris mitigation because the technical 
infrastructure is tied to a regulatory body that could both verify and enforce compliance.  
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IV. COMMERCIAL SSA TECHNICAL INFRASTRUCTURE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Various factors have led to the rise of commercial SSA in the last ten or so years. 
In general, the limitations of existing SSA systems, the advancement of technology, and 
the increase of commercial space activities have created opportunities for the private sector 
to establish SSA systems and services. Commercial SSA also generally offers higher levels 
of transparency and more customized SSA services that simply cannot be provided by 
many non-commercial SSA systems. More specifically, the 2018 report “Global Trends in 
Space Situational Awareness and Space Traffic Management” noted that while the “private 
sector has always been a significant part of the SSA enterprise,” the functional 
modularization of SSA is allowing more private sector players to participate.102 The report 
describes functional modularization as breaking up SSA into individual components such 
as data collection, processing, software, and product generation.103 Functional 
modularization allows commercial companies to sell piecemeal information that 
contributes to SSA as a whole rather than the need to create an entire end-to-end SSA 
system.104  
B. OVERVIEW OF COMMERCIAL SSA SYSTEMS 
This section will cover several major commercial SSA systems. Each company 
focuses on a different aspect of SSA. The companies range from Silicon Valley startups to 
international commercial partnerships. This section will also introduce two commercial 
entities without SSA sensors but still contribute significantly toward SSA.  
1. ExoAnalytic Solutions 
ExoAnalytic Solutions is a U.S.-based company that specializes in GEO SSA, 
operates a global network of ground-based optical sensors, and offers customers multiple 
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web-based platforms. Three career physicists founded ExoAnalytics in 2008. The 
headquarters is in Foothill Ranch, California, and there are several other offices located 
across the United States.105 With the first sensors deployed in 2013, ExoAnalytics currently 
operates the largest network of ground-based optical sensors in the world.106 ExoAnalytics 
categorizes its business into three “solutions”: Space Domain Awareness, Missile Defense 
Technology, and Systems Analysis.107 This section will cover Space Domain Awareness 
since it is most applicable to space debris mitigation. Although the company works closely 
with the defense and intelligence sector, the sensor network is 100% privately funded and 
provides services to customers worldwide with transparency.108  
ExoAnalytics owns and operates the ExoAalytic Global Telescope Network 
(EGTN). The EGTN includes more than 30 observatories and 300 telescopes worldwide 
that collect angle and brightness measurements of space objects.109 Figure 6 shows the 
locations of EGTN’s sites. The sensors’ diverse placement around the world allows the 
EGTN to monitor 100% of both the GEO belt and the graveyard region at 99% availability, 
pending weather and lighting conditions.110 The sensors also regularly detect and track 
objects in MEO and HEO.111 The EGTN can detect a 10 cm object and achieve an accuracy 
of about 0.1 to 0.25 arcseconds in GEO.112 In comparison, the EGTN is 4 – 10 times more 
accurate than the SSN’s ground-based optical sensors for tracking objects in GEO.113 
Additionally, the EGTN collected over 200 million observations in 2018, whereas ISON 
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collected just 20 million observations in 2017.114 ExoAnalytics plans to continue leasing 
sites and placing telescopes around the world.115 
 
Figure 6. The ExoAnalytic Global Telescope Network116 
In addition to hardware, ExoAnalytics offers extensive software and automated 
processing products to its customers. The ExoAnalytic Space Operations Center (ESpOC) 
software suite encompasses the ESpOC Command Center and ExoMaps. From the 
company’s website, “the ESpOC Command Center enables remote command and control 
of all ExoAnalytic sensors, automatically integrates and fuses data from multiple sensors 
in real-time, and overlays all collected data in real-time on a full-sky common operational 
picture.”117 It goes on to describe ExoMaps as “a browsable interface into ExoAnalytic’s 
historical and near-real-time observation archive, with integrated analyst tools such as orbit 
 
114 Jeffries, “ExoAnalytic Solutions Capabilities Overview,” 4; Molotov et al., “ISON Network 
Tracking of Space Debris,” 49. 
115 Lal et al., Global Trends, 29. 
116 Source: ExoAnalytic Solutions, “Who We Are – ExoAnalytic Solutions.” 
117 “Space Domain Awareness – ExoAnalytic Solutions,” ExoAnalytic Solutions, accessed March 8, 
2021, https://exoanalytic.com/space-domain-awareness/. 
38 
determination.”118 These products can be acquired by purchasing a license and installing 
them on a computer or a virtual machine.119  
ExoAnalytics offers additional products and services useful to the space 
community, which can be found on their publicly available Multiple Award Schedule 
(MAS)120 and commercial pricing list.121 The ESpOC Catalog, which is separate from 
Exomaps, has tools that autonomously correlate known tracked objects, perform orbit 
determination with less than 10 m of error at GEO, and produce timely alerts such as 
conjunction warnings.122 Customers can also purchase observation data from a historical 
archive or even from dedicated telescopes. Customers can even request ExoAnalytic 
subject matter experts to provide real-time support through the Event Support Service.123 
Altogether, ExoAnalytics could help regulators maintain SSA in MEO, GEO, and HEO 
orbits.  
2. LeoLabs 
LeoLabs is a U.S.-based company that focuses on LEO SSA, operates a global 
network of phased-array radars, and offers customers a cloud-based data platform. In 2016, 
a team of scientists and space industry veterans founded LeoLabs in Menlo Park, 
California. Originally a spinoff of Stanford Research Institute (SRI) International, 
“LeoLabs is built on 30+ years of R&D [research and development] in radar systems and 
satellite-tracking algorithms.”124 LeoLabs provides SSA services to satellite operators, 
regulators, defense applications, and insurance companies alike.125  
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LeoLabs operates three unique phased-array radars around the world. Two are 
ultra-high frequency (UHF), and their newest radar is S-band.126 The first UHF radar is the 
Poker Flat Incoherent Scatter Radar (PFISR) near Fairbanks, Alaska. This location allows 
for coverage in the Northern Hemisphere and satellites with higher inclinations.127 
Operational since 2007,  the radar was initially built by SRI International and the National 
Science Foundation before LeoLabs purchased it.128 The PFISR is a two-dimensional 
phased array radar that consists of 4,096 transmitting and receiving elements.129 It detects 
objects 10 cm or greater in LEO with a range uncertainty of about 15 m and a doppler 
uncertainty of about 3 m/s.130 On average, the PFISR makes about 6.5 million 
measurements and tracks about 10 million unique space objects a month based on data 
from March 2020 to February 2021.131  
The second UHF radar is the Midland Space Radar (MSR) near Midland, Texas. 
This location is better suited to track satellites with equatorial to middle inclinations. 
Commissioned by LeoLabs in 2017, the MSR uses a proprietary one-dimensional 
design.132 Like the PFISR, the MSR detects 10 cm objects or larger in LEO with a range 
uncertainty of 15 m.133 Different from the PFISR, the MSR has a more sensitive doppler 
uncertainty of 25 cm/s.134 On average, the MSR makes about 1.6 million measurements 
and tracks about 6.5 thousand unique space objects per month.135 Together, both the PFISR 
and the MSR achieve global LEO coverage with multiple satellite revisits a day. 
 
126 S-band is in the upper bound of UHF and the lower bounds of super high frequency (SHF). 
127 “Radars,” LeoLabs, accessed March 10, 2021, https://www.leolabs.space/radars/. 
128 LeoLabs. 
129 LeoLabs. 
130 Nathan Griffith et al., Commercial Space Tracking Services for Small Satellites, SSC19-WKVI-03 
(Menlo Park, CA: LeoLabs, Inc., 2019), 2. 
131 LeoLabs, “Radars.” 
132 Griffith et al., Commercial Space Tracking Services for Small Satellites, 2. 
133 Griffith et al., 2. 
134 Griffith et al., 2. 
135 LeoLabs, “Radars.” 
40 
LeoLab’s third and newest radar is the Kiwi Space Radar (KSR),136 which went 
operational in late 2019. Located in the Central Otago region of New Zealand, the KSR is 
LeoLab’s first radar in the Southern Hemisphere, covering mid-inclination orbits.137 The 
KSR uses LeoLab’s proprietary S-band technology that reliably detects LEO objects as 
small as 2 cm, which is a significant leap in capability compared to many existing SSA 
radars in the world today.138 Based on the same time period of PFISR’s and MSR’s data, 
KSR makes about 5 million measurements and tracks about 12.2 thousand unique space 
objects a month.139 
Moving onto LeoLab’s data services platform, the company handles all data 
processing for its customers. LeoLabs process all data by utilizing machine learning 
algorithms to deliver information to customers in real time.140 Furthermore, LeoLabs 
streamlines the information flow from radars to users via edge processing, cloud 
processing, and automation.141 Edge processing at each radar minimizes the need for 
follow-on processing after data from all radars are aggregated. Cloud processing minimizes 
the hardware processing requirements that LeoLabs must operate and maintain. 
Automation minimizes human delays when processing massive amounts of data. By 
handling all of the radar operations and data processing, LeoLabs is able to provide end-
to-end SSA services to its customers for LEO.  
LeoLab’s data has advantages over the free TLE data provided by the U.S. 
government’s SSN. The SSN’s use of TLE’s represent only approximations of a space 
object’s actual “orbit and may have errors of several kilometers.”142 On the other hand, 
LeoLabs delivers more accurate orbital state vectors and uses higher fidelity force models, 
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which results in uncertainties of about 15 meters.143 Additionally, LeoLabs uses a Kalman 
filter algorithm for orbital state estimations.144 This algorithm type takes advantage of 
LeoLab’s timely phased array radars to process accurate orbital state vectors during a single 
satellite pass. In contrast, the SSN uses batch filtering that requires more data over time, as 
discussed in Chapter 2. Lastly, LeoLabs uses the International Laser Ranging Service as 
an independent third party to fully characterize LeoLab’s sensors’ performance, thus 
ensuring high fidelity data from the beginning.145 LeoLab’s calculated sensor bias and 
uncertainty are publicly available on their website as measures of transparency.  
In addition to handling 100% of the radar operations and processing, LeoLabs 
offers a web-based platform for customers to access its services. The “platform is 
accessible through two primary interfaces: A web-based API146 (suitable for custom 
analysis scripts and automation tasks), and a graphically oriented web application (focused 
on intuitive plots and visualizations of the available data).”147 Figure 7 shows an example 
of the web-based visualization of LEO objects and LeoLab’s radars’ locations. Some of 
LeoLabs’ services include tracking and monitoring, regulatory reporting, space domain 
awareness, and collision avoidance, all without the need to install local software 
packages.148 The company markets toward satellite operators, regulators, national defense 
stakeholders, and the insurance industry.149 
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Figure 7. LeoLab’s Interactive Visualization of LEO Objects150 
LeoLab’s services for regulators are of particular interest. LeoLabs promotes itself 
as a regulatory and sustainability platform that allows regulators to assess actionable 
information when needed.151 LeoLabs offers regulators real-time compliance dashboards 
so they can knowledgeably communicate with stakeholders.152 For example, the New 
Zealand Space Agency (NZSA) is the first regulatory body to use LeoLab’s services for 
compliance purposes.153 Since June 25, 2019, the NZSA relies on LeoLab’s information 
“to ensure satellites launched from New Zealand are complying with licensing rules.”154 
This may prove as a model for space regulators and commercial SSA in the future.  
3. NorthStar Earth and Space 
NorthStar Earth and Space is an emerging Canadian company that plans to build 
the first commercial space-based SSA system and offer SSA data services. In October 
2020, the company announced it had ordered three satellites with optical payloads devoted 
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to SSA.155 The three satellites are scheduled to launch in 2022 and will operate in LEO. 
These three satellites are the first of twelve planned satellites. As for data services, 
NorthStar plans to offer space conjunction warnings, a space object catalog, and a variety 
of other customer services to space operators as a subscription service, similar to LeoLabs 
and ExoAnalytics.156 NorthStar markets its services toward private and government clients, 
regulators, and insurance companies. Although technical details are not available for the 
emerging company’s systems, NorthStar could fill the commercial space-based SSA gap. 
4. Space Data Association (SDA)  
Unlike previous SSA systems discussed so far, the Space Data Association (SDA) 
does not collect its own data. However, the SDA still plays an important role in SSA. The 
SDA contributes significantly toward a cooperative approach for SSA data sharing, safety 
of flight, and space sustainability.  
The SDA was created in response to gaps in SSA services during the 2000s. 
Existing SSA products and services failed to meet commercial satellite operator needs.157 
Commercial satellite operators were also frustrated over the lack of customer service from 
the U.S. military.158 Officially formed in 2009, the SDA was incorporated in the Isle of 
Man, Great Britain, and its founding members were Intelsat, SES, Inmarsat, and Eutelsat, 
which are private space operators.159 The SDA “is a formal, nonprofit association of civil, 
commercial and military spacecraft operators that supports the controlled, reliable and 
efficient sharing of data that is critical to the safety and integrity of satellite operations.”160 
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The SDA also promotes responsible behaviors and best practices from space operators 
across all orbital domains to ensure safety, protecting key assets, and space 
sustainability.161 For a fee, membership is open to all satellite operators and stakeholders. 
Over 30 satellite operators and over 600 satellites participate in the SDA.162 American 
government agencies, such as NASA and NOAA, are included as participants.  
The SDA offers its members a variety of SSA services and benefits. Its members 
have access to conjunction assessments and radio frequency interference geolocation.163 
The SDA ensures its data and collision warnings are transparent, timely, and actionable.164 
The SDA has the legal and organizational structure to “provide protections and 
enforcement mechanisms to ensure data is only used for intended purposes.”165 Members 
will be given “authoritative contact information for a given space object” to deconflict 
events, as necessary.166  
The Space Data Center (SDC) is the operational arm of the SDA. Analytical 
Graphics, Inc.’s (AGI)167 Commercial Space Operations Center (ComSpOC) powers the 
SDC.168 The SDC uses a machine-to-machine interface that is effective and secure for 
sharing operational data.169 The SDC fuses member-provided ephemerides, TLEs, special 
perturbation data, and other available sources to ensure accurate data and warnings are 
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tailored to SDA members.170 This SDC system benefits from AGI experts who closely 
monitor data from various sources for quality.171  
SDA announced a transition to SDC 2.0 in 2017. Prior to SDC 2.0, the SDA pointed 
to at least three limitations:  
• “Inter-system biases in operator systems”172
• “Availability and accuracy limitations of debris data, particularly for
objects” smaller than 1 m173
• “Lack of transparency and consistent availability of government-provided
data”174
SDC 2.0 aims towards complete independence from the U.S. military’s data and services 
by “using commercial SSA data to feed their own catalog.”175 The catalog will evolve to 
include all objects greater than 20 cm and to be more extensive than existing public space 
catalogs.176 The SDA believes commercial service agreements will also lead to increased 
transparency, reliability, and timeliness.177 Regulators could either take note of the SDA’s 
accomplishments in SSA if creating government SSA systems or even participate in the 
SDA as a member. 
5. Space Safety Coalition (SSC)
The Space Safety Coalition (SSC) is a commercial approach to influence policy 
and promote long-term space sustainability. Formed in 2019, the SSC is “an ad hoc 
coalition of companies, organizations, and other government and industry stakeholders that 
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actively promotes responsible space safety through the adoption of relevant international 
standards, guidelines and practices, and the development of more effective space safety 
guidelines and best practices.”178 The SSC released its “Best Practices for the Sustainability 
of Space Operations” in 2019 to address space governance gaps and promote better 
“spacecraft design, operations, and disposal practices.”179 With 48 endorsees, the SSC aims 
to make a difference in advance of space treaties, guidelines, and regulations.180  
Figure 8. “Virtuous Cycle Interaction of Global Space Debris Mitigation 
Activities.”181 
The SSC plays “a key role in codifying and promoting established commercial best 
practices for all phases of the spacecraft life cycle” and can advocate for a holistic approach 
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toward space debris mitigation.182 Figure 8 shows the interaction between various space 
and regulatory organizations that influence global space debris mitigation activities. The 
SSC already made an impact by making several appearances in the 2020 report “Space 
Traffic Management” by the National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA). 
Although not a technical SSA system, the SSC could very well influence national and 
international regulators on the best way forward for establishing a verification mechanism 
for orbital debris mitigation. 
C. LIMITATIONS  
No single commercial entity provides comprehensive end-to-end SSA services for 
all orbital regimes. In essence, each company contributes toward a complete catalog for all 
orbital regimes in order to be fully independent of the U.S. government. ExoAnalytics 
excels at ground-based optical sensors for MEO, GEO, and HEO. LeoLabs focuses on LEO 
via its ground-based phased array radars. The SDA relies on SSA data from outside 
sources. A regulator would have to maintain multiple contracts and ensure data from 
numerous sources are properly fused.  
Long term, there could be challenges with the private industry in general as 
commercial SSA matures. The commercial SSA companies discussed all advocate 
transparency, but will profits or bottom lines conflict with doing the right thing? The 
private industry may not be held to the same accountability as democratic governments 
without the right regulations. Conversely, regulations could negatively impact the free 
market. 
D. CONCLUSION 
Commercial SSA systems may serve as an alternative to individual-government 
SSA systems. The functional modularization of commercial SSA allows regulators to 
contract companies based on the needs of the regulator. One step further, commercial 
companies can tailor their products and services to meet each customer’s needs. 
Commercial SSA is significantly less costly than every spacefaring nation and international 
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organization building, maintaining, and operating a complete SSA system. Innovation and 
the free-market drive companies to offer better quality SSA products and services. 
Commercial SSA offers regulators transparency, which is something government and 
scientific community SSA systems lack.  
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V. FUTURE OPTIONS FOR A SPACE DEBRIS VERIFICATION 
MECHANISM USING COMMERCIAL SSA SYSTEMS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Recent advances in the private sector support that commercial SSA systems can 
either augment or serve as an alternative to government and scientific community SSA 
systems. The previous chapters examined existing SSA technical infrastructures around the 
world. With the capability of commercial SSA systems to detect and track 2 cm objects in 
LEO and 10 cm objects in GEO, regulators could use commercial SSA data to hold space 
operators accountable to space debris mitigation and other compliance measures. This 
chapter will focus on exploring the advantages and disadvantages of four possible future 
options for how commercial SSA systems could be applied as a verification mechanism 
for space debris mitigation while taking into account applicable policy. To narrow the 
scope of the global space debris issue, this chapter will consider the international 
framework and the United States for the domestic level. The four options are (1) 
continuation of the status quo, (2) international enforcement, (3) domestic enforcement, 
and (4) commercial best practices. 
B. THE STATUS QUO AND EXISTING SPACE DEBRIS MITIGATION 
POLICIES 
The status quo represents a situation in which government systems dominate, and 
commercial SSA plays a secondary role as a space debris verification mechanism, although 
it allows incremental policy changes over long periods of time. Current space debris 
mitigation policies include international treaties and non-binding guidelines and domestic 
laws and guidelines. The use of commercial SSA as a regulatory mechanism by 
governments is not widespread, except for the partnership between New Zealand and 
LeoLabs. The U.S. military remains the primary source for most SSA data and services to 
space operators around the world. Since commercial SSA is not primarily used as a 
verification mechanism for space debris mitigation, this section will provide a background 
of existing international policy and U.S. domestic policy to provide context on where 
commercial SSA could effectively be applied. To stay on the path of the status quo, 
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commercial SSA would continue to supplement existing SSA data sources, such as the 
DOD’s SSN.  
1. International Space Debris Mitigation Policy 
Four key international space organizations significantly influence current 
international space traffic management and space debris mitigation policies. However, 
none operate their own SSA infrastructures. The 2020 National Academy of Public 
Administration (NAPA) space traffic management report succinctly describes each 
organization: 
• International Telecommunication Union (ITU). The ITU is a U.N. 
agency that governs the use of the radio frequency spectrum. ITU 
assigns physical satellite orbital slots in geostationary orbit.  
• United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UN 
COPUOS). COPUOS was established in 1959 as a forum for discussing 
international governance of outer space. In recent years, COPUOS 
members have discussed issues like space debris management, creating 
guidelines for the long-term sustainability of space, and determining if 
more concrete solutions are necessary or possible. 
• Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee (IADC). 
Composed of national space agencies, IADC’s facilitates research on 
space debris and fosters international cooperation on responses and 
mitigation techniques. 
• The United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA). 
UNOOSA assists U.N. Member States to establish legal and regulatory 
frameworks to govern space activities. It also works to strengthen the 
capacity of developing countries to use space science technology and 
applications for development.183 
The current legal framework for space debris mitigation policy can be traced back 
to the 1967 Outer Space Treaty and the 1972 Space Liability Convention. The Outer Space 
Treaty has been ratified by 111 countries, and the Space Liability Convention has been 
ratified by 98 countries.184 The Outer Space Treaty generally calls for the peaceful use of 
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space and declares that all nations should have access to and benefit from space. Although 
space debris mitigation is not explicitly mentioned in the Outer Space Treaty, Article VII 
broadly states each nation is internationally liable for damages to another nation in outer 
space.185 The Space Liability Convention goes on to further define liability for damages in 
space. However, neither the Outer Space Treaty nor the Space Liability Convention could 
predict the growth of commercial space activities. Also, neither specifically address 
liability for damages caused by non-trackable space debris nor discuss space debris 
mitigation when debris cannot be associated to a launching state.  
The first set of international policies to specifically address space debris was the 
2007 United Nations Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines of the Committee on the Peaceful 
Uses of Outer Space. The U.N. guidelines can be divided into two broad categories: those 
that limit creating debris in the near term, such as avoidance of break-ups, and those that 
limit creating debris in the long term, such as end-of-life procedures. However, there are 
no quantitative restrictions or specific timelines. These U.N. guidelines are voluntary and 
not legally binding under international law. 
Most recently, UN COPUOS ratified the Guidelines for the Long-term 
Sustainability of Outer Space Activities (LTS) in June 2019. While this was an 
international space cooperation achievement, the LTS guidelines did not advance existing 
space debris mitigation guidelines. Instead, the LTS guidelines state, “Although the 
international guidelines and standards on space debris mitigation were not legally binding, 
they could nevertheless facilitate the practical application of the fault-based liability regime 
set out in the five United Nations treaties on outer space.”186 The LTS also points to the 
IADC’s existing 25-year post-mission disposal guidelines as a reference for U.N. members 
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to adhere to. There are still many gaps concerning international space debris mitigation 
policy, and COPUOS members agree this issue is far from over.187 
2. United States Domestic Space Debris Mitigation Policy 
Regulatory bodies are spread across several federal government agencies in the 
United States. They play important roles from pre-flight to space sustainability. From the 
2020 NAPA Report, the leading civil agencies are:  
• The Department of Commerce: The Department of Commerce (DOC) 
is a government department concerned with promoting job creation and 
economic growth through providing data and research necessary to 
support commerce, and by setting standards that foster innovation.24 
Commerce is organized across 13 Bureaus and 15 Offices, including the 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). The 
Office of Space Commerce currently sits within NOAA. The mission of 
this office is to foster an economic and policy environment that ensures 
the growth and international competitiveness of the U.S. commercial 
space industry.  
• The Department of Transportation: The Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA) at the Department of Transportation (DOT) 
regulates all aspects of civil aviation and the movement of space 
vehicles through the atmosphere. Established under the Commercial 
Space Launch Act of 1984, the Office of Commercial Space 
Transportation (known by the initials AST) was tasked to regulate the 
U.S. commercial space transportation industry, to ensure compliance 
with international obligations of the United States. Currently, AST 
conducts launch and re-entry permitting and licensing for commercial 
space flights. 
• The Federal Communications Commission: The FCC is an independent 
government agency that regulates interstate and international radio, 
television, wire, satellite, and cable communication. Considering orbital 
debris mitigation plans to be within its responsibilities and obligations, 
FCC has issued regulations that state that unless the FCC has already 
authorized a satellite system, the satellite system must submit a 
description of the design and operational strategies it will use to mitigate 
orbital debris.  
• The National Aeronautics and Space Administration: Along with its 
broad responsibilities for civilian space travel and aeronautics and space 
research, NASA tracks space debris associated with the protection of 
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NASA assets in space and conducts a broad portfolio of basic research 
about the use of space for research and commercial purposes.  
• Department of State: The State Department is the external facing federal 
entity that discusses and mediates international space policy. Its Office 
of Space and Advanced Technology handles international space issues 
and represents the United States in the United Nations Committee on 
the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) and the United Nations 
and the United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs. This office also 
maintains the official United States registry of objects launched into 
outer space and supports U.S. civil space entities in upholding 
international agreements.188 
In addition to the mentioned regulatory bodies, “the Department of Defense (DOD) 
is the government authority tasked with coordinating and supervising all agencies and 
functions of the government directly related to national security and the U.S. Armed 
Forces.”189 The National Space Council (NSC) and the United States Congress generate 
domestic space policy. Reestablished in 2017, the NSC is chaired by the vice president. 
However, it must be noted the NSC exists at the discretion of the president. In March 2021, 
the Biden administration announced it will continue the NSC.190 The NSC operates as an 
office of policy development and handles a portfolio of civil, commercial, national security, 
and international space policy matters.191 As for Congress, there are various Senate and 
House subcommittees that deal with space-related activities. Congress provides oversight, 
policy framework, and funding for all government space activities and policy 
implementation.  
U.S. domestic policy on space debris mitigation is more progressive than its 
international counterparts. NASA was the first organization in the world to develop orbital 
debris mitigation policy and guidelines with its “NASA Management Instruction 
(NMI)1700.8 Policy for Limiting Orbital Debris Generation” in 1993.192 Along with the 
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Department of Defense, NASA then led the effort to establish the 2001 U.S. Government 
Orbital Debris Mitigation Standard Practices (USG ODMSP). The USG ODMSP applies 
only to U.S. government space activities, not commercial space activities.193 Civil space 
activities follow the regulations set forth by DOC, DOT, and FCC. The USG ODMSP 
adopted the rule for disposing space objects no longer than 25 years after mission 
completion.194 The IADC later adopted the 25-year rule into its guidelines in 2002.  
The most recent domestic space debris policy updates include President Trump’s 
“Space Policy Directive-3” (SPD-3) in 2018 and the update to ODMSP in 2019. SPD-3 
calls on the Department of Commerce to become the civil space traffic management agency 
for the U.S. government. Furthermore, it calls on OSC to create an Open Architecture 
Space Situational Awareness Data Repository (OADR) and “to ensure [the] safe 
coordination of space traffic in this future operating environment…in recognition of the 
need for DOD to focus on maintaining access to and freedom of action in space.”195 SPD-
3 lists the following essential features of the OADR:  
• Data integrity measures to ensure data accuracy and availability; 
• Data standards to ensure sufficient quality from diverse sources; 
• Measures to safeguard proprietary or sensitive data, including national 
security information; 
• The inclusion of satellite owner-operator ephemerides to inform orbital 
location and planned maneuvers; and 
• Standardized formats to enable development of applications to leverage 
the data.196 
This is a major shift of responsibility from the DOD to the DOC. What the OADR will 
look like, however, remains to be determined. 
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The National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA), an independent 
organization chartered by Congress, released a report in August 2020 to identify the best 
federal agency best suited to be the lead agency for civil space traffic management. NAPA 
evaluated the DOD, NASA, FAA AST, and DOC OSC on functional and technical 
competency, organizational leadership and capacity, partnerships, and stakeholders and 
customers. After careful consideration, the NAPA report concluded that DOC OSC is best 
suited to perform non-military SSA and STM tasks over the other federal agencies because 
of competencies and potential in each evaluated area.197  
3. Advantages 
The advantage of the status quo is that change would take place gradually. Gradual 
change often leads to relative predictability and reduces uncertainty, which is generally 
preferable for the private sector. Additionally, the status quo allows the United States to 
maintain its leadership in space policy since it historically set the trends for space debris 
mitigation. If the United States remains on the path directed by SPD-3, the outcome will 
be in line with the third future option of primarily domestic enforcement. If OSC does not 
get the required funding, the United States will remain with the status quo of incremental 
changes over time.  
4. Disadvantages 
Continuation of the status quo may be unsuitable to meet existing space debris 
mitigation guidelines. Space policy expert Brian Weeden criticizes the current system 
stating, “A study was done by the European Space Agency that found large constellations 
need better than 90% compliance with the 25-year rule to avoid a significant impact on the 
space environment. Current compliance for existing satellites is around 60% and shows 
only a slight upward trend.”198 Stricter and more binding space governance will likely be 
required to meet the already lenient space debris mitigation guidelines. 
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There are several other disadvantages of the status quo. First, regulatory 
organizations will continue to rely on U.S. DOD-provided SSA data, which lacks 
transparency for the international space community. There is no formal SSA entity for 
international matters, and the United States is in the middle of transitioning civil SSA 
responsibilities from the military to a civil agency. Second, the existing space debris legal 
framework remains to be tested after a debris-creating event has occurred. For example, 
the 2009 collision between Cosmos 2251 and Iridium 33 was a seemingly clear case where 
the 1972 Space Liability Convention could have been applied. However, space law expert 
Frans von der Dunk summarized, “The absence of a clear, or at least workable definition, 
of ‘fault’” led to the Space Liability Convention not being invoked.199 To this day, the 1972 
Space Liability Convention has not been invoked despite multiple debris-creating events 
since the convention was ratified.200 Third, the original ratified space treaties were unable 
to predict the rise of the commercial sector. In summary, many of the disadvantages of the 
status quo are tied to weak international policies and enforcement mechanisms. 
As for the United States, the 2019 USG ODMSP was, unfortunately, not as 
groundbreaking as it could have been. The latest ODMSP was more of an incremental 
update, albeit a welcomed one. The ODMSP still only applies to the U.S. government, still 
maintains the 25-year rule, and it still does not address the commercial sector. It does, at 
least, address small satellites (CubeSats), large constellations of 100 or more satellites, and 
active space debris removal. The United States missed an opportunity to expand the 
application of the guidelines for the commercial sector or at least tighten the 25-year rule 
for government space programs.  
C. WORKING AT THE INTERNATIONAL LEVEL: INTERNATIONAL 
ENFORCEMENT 
In this future option, a global governance regime could use commercial SSA 
systems as a space debris verification mechanism. A global governance body, such as the 
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United Nations, could either take a top-down or bottom-up approach. In a top-down 
approach, the United Nations would enforce international debris mitigation measures. In a 
bottom-up approach, the United Nations would set a framework for individual nations to 
enforce international standards. The United Nations could use commercial SSA data in 
both cases, either to use it as a verification mechanism to enforce the international standards 
itself or to hold nations accountable to enforce the international standards. Considering 
commercial SSA data is readily available, the U.N. would not need to create its own 
independent SSA system. Both approaches require restructuring the current international 
framework since the current space debris mitigation guidelines are voluntary and non-
binding. Whether a top-down or bottom-up approach, a global solution may be ideal for 
addressing the space debris problem, which is non-discriminatory toward national borders 
on Earth. 
To achieve a top-down governance regime, restructuring the existing national 
framework requires an international governing body with authority to enforce and updated 
space debris mitigation policies that are legally binding. The 2018 “Global Trends” report 
points to the International Civil Air Organization (ICAO) as a model for a top-down 
approach to harmonize and standardize regulations.201 The ICAO is a United Nations 
agency responsible for air transportation standards. However, the ICAO is not a true top-
down governing body because the ICAO is not a global regulator.202 Furthermore, U.N. 
agencies “do not have any authority over national governments in the areas of international 
priorities they are established for.”203 Since there are no international top-down models to 
follow, space debris mitigation may be one of the first instances where one should be 
established. 
A regulatory enforcement body could be added to COPUOS, IADC, or UNOOSA, 
if the U.N. were to undertake a top-down approach. Although this would require 
tremendous political will, establishing binding space treaties, such as the Outer Space 
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Treaties, is possible. Updating rules and processes would matter greatly. A centralized 
international regulatory body with enforcement authority could primarily use commercial 
SSA data instead of government-provided data to overcome any bias or transparency 
concerns of using a particular nation’s government SSA system.  
There are several bottom-up models for a space debris international governing body 
to follow. Two models are the ITU and international maritime navigation. The ITU is 
already involved with space traffic management in that it assigns physical satellite orbital 
slots in geostationary orbit.204 More relevant to a bottom-up approach, however, the ITU 
does not enforce its policies itself. Enforcement occurs at the national level. For example, 
the United States FCC applies ITU rules to all U.S. spacecraft and satellites that use radio 
spectrum.205 
Similarly, international maritime navigation rules are enforced by individual 
nations through navies conducting freedom of navigation operations and local coast guards. 
The U.N. Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea 
established the international maritime rules of the road in 1972 and became effective in 
1977.206 All vessels flying the flags of nations that ratified the treaty are bound to the 
rules.207 For the United States, whoever violates the international rules is liable to a civil 
monetary penalty.208 Since the 1972 Space Liability Convention generally follows this 
model, a future updated version could specifically address orbital debris mitigation 
enforcement.  
1. Advantages 
Restructuring the current international framework to form legally binding policies 
to achieve results in space debris mitigation may be the ideal future option. All spacefaring 
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actors would be held to the same standard, whether the enforcement itself occurs at the 
international level or the domestic level. Additionally, the process to reach international 
agreements could foster cooperation along the way. Using commercial SSA systems as a 
verification mechanism to enforce legally binding measures could be a transparent solution 
as opposed to using individual government SSA systems or even the scientific 
community’s SSA system that are often tied to governments.  
2. Disadvantages 
One of the major disadvantages of an international solution is how the political and 
space communities will get there. The 2018 “Global Trends” report finds, “It does not 
appear from current trends that there will likely be agreement on a binding global STM 
framework in the next decade.”209 The global community generally lacks the political will 
to establish further legally binding treaties on space debris mitigation, as recently 
demonstrated by the 2019 Long Term Sustainability guidelines. 
Two possible disadvantages for commercial SSA systems could be the perception 
of international governments relying on a commercial means as a verification mechanism 
and the notion of international organizations using a for-profit company in general. 
Commercial companies are ultimately tied to their country of origin, and currently, the 
major commercial SSA companies are based in the United States. The international 
community could perceive the United States as having too much of a hand in space debris 
mitigation and space traffic management. International commercial consortiums like the 
SDA may be better suited for this role over individual commercial SSA systems. 
D. WORKING WITH INDIVIDUAL GOVERNMENTS: DOMESTIC 
ENFORCEMENT 
In contrast to international enforcement, individual nations could take it upon 
themselves to create and enforce both international and domestic space debris mitigation 
measures. Although the lines between domestic enforcement and bottom-up international 
enforcement are blurred, this domestic enforcement option assumes no new international 
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policies have been created. Both the skepticism toward military SSA systems and the lack 
of comprehensive standalone civil SSA systems are opportunities for commercial SSA 
systems to be a solution for regulators. Commercial SSA can be a transparent solution for 
individual nations seeking to have a verification mechanism for orbital debris without 
acquiring, operating, and maintaining a comprehensive SSA system. Furthermore, 
regulators can tailor commercial SSA services to meet their individual needs to enforce 
domestic space debris mitigation policies as they see fit. Canada, New Zealand, and the 
United States provide insight on how regulators and the commercial SSA could work 
together at the domestic level.  
First, Canada’s privatized air traffic control experience can provide a model for 
using commercial SSA as a space debris mitigation verification mechanism. “On 
November 1, 1996, the Canadian federal government transferred responsibility for its air 
traffic control system to a private nonprofit corporation,” NAV Canada, to respond to 
budget strains and inflated acquisition costs.210 Commercial aviation management, airline 
pilots, and air traffic controllers formed a coalition to search for a solution to meet the 
needs at the time.211  The answer was privatization. NAV Canada formed as a nonshared 
capital corporate structure where a private-sector corporation was independent of the 
government. Still, they maintained a business-style board of directors and management 
structure.212 The nonshared capital structure model allowed the airline industry to accept 
NAV Canada’s monopoly status.213 Through the ANS Act and the International Civil 
Aviation Organization’s Policies on Charges for Airports and Air Navigation Services, 
customers funded NAV Canada directly in place of taxes.214 “Ever since NAV Canada 
assumed responsibility for ANS operations from the [Canadian] government, it has 
increased the pace of technological modernization, dramatically improved the system’s 
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efficiency and productivity, and achieved a one-third reduction in user fees.”215 Canada’s 
transition to a privatized air traffic control experience shows how the commercial sector 
could meet public safety needs. 
Similarly, commercial SSA companies could partner with national governments as 
NAV Canada partnered with its government to act as a verification mechanism for orbital 
debris mitigation and space traffic management. Key stakeholders such as the Space Data 
Association, Space Safety Coalition, and space operators could advocate for commercial 
SSA companies to follow such a model of how the commercial aviation industry and other 
stakeholders supported a privatized solution in Canada. In the example of the United States, 
following this model would allow the DOD to focus on national security and civil agencies 
to focus on orbital debris mitigation and space traffic management without acquiring, 
operating, and maintaining its SSA system, leveraging existing commercial SSA 
companies.  
Second, New Zealand’s partnership with LeoLabs, which was introduced in 
Chapter 4, is an example of the commercial sector working hand-in-hand with regulators. 
Following this example, SSA companies would not have to give up their for-profit status 
in the NAV Canada model. The New Zealand Space Agency (NZSA) is New Zealand’s 
lead government agency for the commercial use of space. New Zealand took a proactive 
approach to minimize space debris by partnering with a commercial SSA company.216 In 
September 2018, LeoLabs and New Zealand’s Ministry of Business, Innovation, and 
Employment announced a memorandum of understanding that implemented the use of 
LeoLab’s regulatory platform.217 Through LeoLab’s Space Regulatory and Sustainability 
Platform, the software analyzes SSA data from LeoLab’s global radar system to ensure 
satellites launched from New Zealand are complying with licensing rules.218 Peter 
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Crabtree, head of the NZSA, commented, “As a new era of transparency in LEO emerges, 
LeoLabs and our space agency will continue to prove state-of-the-art regulatory practices 
to keep pace with the changing requirements of space commercialization.”219 
Lastly, the United States’ proposed OADR presents an opportunity for commercial 
SSA companies to be the primary contributors of SSA data. The NAPA report discusses a 
future where the United States separates its military and civil SSA data. In this future, the 
DOD’s SSA data will be part of the Unified Data Library (UDL), and civil SSA data will 
be part of the OADR.220 This division of data repositories is part of the effort to transition 
civil SSA responsibilities from the DOD to OSC as directed by SPD-3. While the OADR 
can still use data from the UDL, the NAPA report recognized the limitations of the DOD’s 
inefficient closed, internal system being incompatible with non-DOD entities.221 By 
primarily using commercial SSA data, the OSC’s OADR can overcome the DOD’s 
limitations. The OSC could then transparently exchange data with the international 
community and space operators, especially those that do not have sharing agreements with 
the DOD or pay fees to be part of SDA.  
1. Advantages 
There are several advantages for national governments to use commercial SSA 
systems as a space debris verification mechanism. For one, it is a practical solution since 
there are already models to follow. Governments concerned about data sharing would not 
need to create an additional SSA system for those that already have military SSA systems. 
Likewise, scientific community SSA systems can focus on science rather than civil 
regulatory matters. For governments that do not have a comprehensive SSA system, 
commercial SSA services could offer a more affordable alternative to acquiring, operating, 
and maintaining their own SSA system. By using commercial SSA systems to achieve 
situational awareness, regulators could build confidence to establish better domestic space 
debris mitigation policies. For example, once the framework matures in the United States, 
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the OSC could pursue an updated 5-year or even 1-year deorbiting rule, as proposed by 
space debris expert Darren McKnight.222 Maturing domestic space debris policies could 
lead to building norms to influence international binding policies. 
2. Disadvantages 
The major disadvantage of domestic enforcement has to do with policy, not 
commercial SSA systems. Unless all major spacefaring nations buy-in, domestic 
enforcement does not address the space debris problem because it is a global issue. Also, 
domestic policies will likely not be standardized, and commercial companies would have 
to provide services to meet the demands of each country. A holistic international approach 
may be required to achieve long-term space sustainability.  
E. COMMERCIAL LED: COMMERCIAL BEST PRACTICES 
In response to slow incremental policy changes at both the international and 
domestic levels, the commercial space industry has often taken upon itself to set best 
practices to adhere to. Organizations like the Space Data Association (SDA) and the Space 
Safety Coalition (SSC) have led the effort in the debris area. Overviews of these 
organizations were covered in Chapter 4. Instead of waiting on policy to catch up with the 
space community’s consensus on the orbital debris problem, the commercial community 
could simply continue to regulate itself through best practices of space sustainability. 
The SDA and SSC already provide a model on how commercial best practices can 
move forward. The SDA offers the technical means of SSA data exchange and a network 
for space operators to communicate. The SDA already leverages commercial SSA, so it 
can continue to expand the use of commercial SSA as it matures over time while still using 
the government SSA if it so chose. The SSC maintains its “Best Practices for the 
Sustainability of Space Operations” to address policy gaps. To advance commercial best 
practices, the SDA, SSC, and similar organizations should continue to grow their 
partnerships with each other while expanding their network of space operators, commercial 
and government alike. 
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The next step in commercial best practices would be to enforce agreed-upon space 
debris mitigation measures amongst each other, preferably before collisions occur or when 
regulatory regimes must intervene. A future where the commercial industry can effectively 
police itself, while idealistic, could be done through the SDA and SSC model using 
communication and accurate and timely SSA. Commercial SSA companies like LeoLabs 
and ExoAnalytics could tailor their services toward such an endeavor more quickly than 
the U.S. government’s SSN. A future such as this could ease the burden of governments 
on creating their own SSA and STM infrastructures, especially for governments that cannot 
afford to develop and maintain their own systems.  
1. Advantages 
Although the commercial space sector regulating itself is idealistic, commercial 
best practices add value for the greater space community and are applied simultaneously 
at the national and international levels. Daniel Oltrogge, the founder of the Space Safety 
Coalition, remarks, “It’s not just about treaties, guidelines, and standards. It is all of those, 
plus commercial best practices with aspirational goals of not only meeting but exceeding 
minimum consensus requirements.”223 Groups like the SSC could mature into policy think 
tanks that can continue to advocate for better space sustainability policies at the domestic 
and international levels. Organizations like the SDA offer the rest of the space community 
an avenue to communicate and prevent debris-creating events. International space 
operators and policy groups can foster cooperation via the commercial industry while 
aspiring to achieve long-term sustainability in space. In essence, commercial best practices 
could be a bottom-up approach to influence future international and domestic 
policymaking.  
2. Disadvantages 
Commercial best practices are not a long-term solution. First, joining a commercial 
consortium, such as SDA or SSC, is voluntary. Notable space operators like SpaceX and 
Blue Origin currently do not formally participate. Second, commercial best practices 
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organizations are not as accountable to the public as a democratic government would likely 
be. Finally, commercial organizations lack enforcement mechanisms to ensure space debris 
mitigation measures are met. If enforcement mechanisms are too strict, participants could 
simply opt out.  
F. CONCLUSION 
Commercial SSA systems have strong potential to be applied in all four future 
policy options. At present, they have the capability to act as a verification mechanism for 
objects as small as 2 cm in LEO and 10 cm in GEO. Smaller, non-trackable debris will 
continue to be a problem until technology improves. Their capabilities and services will 
only get better over time as companies innovate, technology progresses, and services 
mature. However, the issue is with policy. There is a need for firmer and clearer space 
debris mitigation measures that are legally binding. There is also a need to formalize civil 
SSA at both the international and domestic levels. The verification mechanism to conduct 
enforcement exists technologically. While this chapter presented four options, the solution 
may not be only one or the other. For instance, commercial best practices in the United 
States could influence regulators to establish better domestic policies. The United States 
could then use its leadership to set international norms, which then could influence the 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
A. KEY POINTS  
This thesis explored two research questions. First, could commercial SSA systems 
be used as a verification mechanism for space debris mitigation accountability? Second, 
how could such a verification regime lead to future enforceable space debris mitigation 
policy? To answer the first question, this thesis surveyed the capabilities and limitations of 
the significant SSA technical infrastructures around the world. For the second research 
question, this thesis explored how commercial SSA systems could be used as a space debris 
verification mechanism in four possible future options. The four options were the status 
quo, international enforcement, domestic enforcement, and commercial best practices.  
The SSA technical infrastructures were divided into three categories. The 
categories were individual government SSA systems, multinational and scientific 
community SSA systems, and commercial SSA systems. Individual government SSA 
systems generally are unable to meet the space community’s needs for transparent data 
sharing because many of these systems are tied to military use. While the United States 
Space Surveillance System (SSN) and Russia’s Space Surveillance System (SSS) are the 
most capable in the world, they may not be the best solution for civil regulatory uses as a 
verification mechanism for orbital debris where transparency and trust are required. 
The next category of international and scientific community SSA systems do not 
entirely overcome the limitations of individual government SSA systems. While bilateral 
and multilateral agreements foster cooperation and trust through burden-sharing, many of 
these SSA systems are still tied to military uses, as seen in the European Space Agency 
SSA Program (ESA SSA). However, the European Union Space Surveillance and Tracking 
(EU SST) may serve as a model for an international SSA framework as a verification 
mechanism for orbital debris mitigation because the technical infrastructure is tied to a 
regulatory body. As for the scientific community SSA systems, the two most significant 
SSA systems are the International Scientific Optical Network (ISON) and the Asia-Pacific 
Ground-Based Optical Space Object Observation System (APOSOS). With ISON directly 
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tied to Russia and APOSOS directly tied to China, there are transparency and trust concerns 
from the international community. Additionally, both ISON and APOSOS rely on optical 
sensors, which do not have comprehensive coverage of LEO. Unless future international 
SSA systems resemble the framework of EU SST, the existing international and scientific 
community may not be the best solution for a space debris verification mechanism.  
The third and final category, commercial SSA systems, presents promising 
alternatives to the first two categories. Today’s commercial SSA systems have the technical 
capability to detect and track space objects as small as 2 cm in LEO and 10 cm in GEO, 
which is comparable or possibly better than non-commercial SSA systems based on public 
data on military SSA systems. International commercial consortiums like the Space Data 
Association (SDA) fuse data from multiple sources and provide participating space 
operators a network to communicate. While no single commercial company offers 
comprehensive SSA capabilities like the United States’ SSN, regulators and space 
operators could use SSA data from multiple commercial companies as needed or 
participate in the Space Data Association’s data exchange services, which fuse data from 
various sources. Commercial SSA companies also offer their customers transparency and 
the ability to tailor their services to meet the needs of their customers, some benefits the 
SSN does not provide to the global space community.  
Once it was determined that commercial SSA systems had the most potential of the 
three categories to serve as a space debris mitigation verification mechanism, this thesis 
then examined how four possible future policy options could apply commercial SSA 
systems. The four policy options were: (1) continuation of the status quo; (2) international 
enforcement; (3) domestic enforcement; and (4) commercial best practices. While 
commercial SSA systems have a place in all four options, each option has its advantages 
and disadvantages.  
The status quo represents a weak regulatory regime at both the international and 
domestic levels, where the United States military provides the bulk of SSA data to space 
operators. The status quo lacks an enforcement mechanism and is constrained by non-
legally-binding policies, such as the United Nation’s Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines 
of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space and the United States’ Orbital 
69 
Debris Mitigation Standard Practices. Although commercial companies could continue to 
augment the United States SSN’s SSA data, restructuring the current regulatory framework 
to establish legally binding policies will be required to achieve better results in space debris 
mitigation.  
The second future option was international enforcement through either a top-down 
or bottom-up approach. In the top-down scenario, the United Nations would both establish 
and enforce space debris mitigation standards. There are no actual examples of an 
international top-down approach analogous to space debris mitigation, so space debris 
mitigation could be the first consideration to establish such a framework. In the bottom-up 
scenario, the United Nations would establish space debris mitigation standards, but 
enforcement would be left to each spacefaring nation. The International 
Telecommunications Union (ITU) and international maritime laws are both models 
international regulators could look to. Since commercial SSA data and services overcome 
the transparency issues of the other categories of SSA systems, international regulators 
could primarily use commercial SSA systems as a space debris verification mechanism. 
Although an international regulatory framework with legally binding space debris 
mitigation measures may be an ideal solution to a global issue, the international community 
currently lacks the political will to get there.  
As for the third option, individual nations could establish and enforce stricter debris 
mitigation measures and use commercial SSA as a space debris verification mechanism. 
The sooner countries that are more active in space establish enforceable space debris 
mitigating policies, the sooner international norms could be set. However, domestic 
enforcement does not entirely address the space debris issue since it is a global issue that 
requires buy-in from all stakeholders. Nonetheless, it is generally a quicker process for 
countries to change their domestic laws rather than wait on the international community to 
agree upon a holistic approach.  
Using commercial SSA systems may be a practical solution for domestic 
enforcement. Governments looking to separate military and civil SSA systems could look 
to commercial SSA to manage civil matters. Additionally, governments that do not have a 
comprehensive SSA system could use commercial SSA systems as a cheaper alternative to 
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the acquisition, operation, and maintenance of a homegrown SSA system. Canada’s use of 
privatized air traffic control is a model for a successful public-private partnership. New 
Zealand’s partnership with LeoLabs is an example of regulators working directly with a 
commercial SSA company. Once countries have an SSA infrastructure in place, regulators 
could then turn their attention to updating domestic space debris mitigation policies and 
establishing international norms that work toward space sustainability. 
The fourth option discussed commercial best practices, whereby the commercial 
sector establishes and advocates better space sustainability policies. The Space Data 
Association (SDA) and the Space Safety Coalition (SSC) are examples of the commercial 
sector being proactive in addressing space sustainability issues. The SDA focuses on SSA 
data exchange and communication, while the SSC concentrates on policy matters. The 
membership of both organizations includes various commercial and government space 
operators that participate voluntarily. Through commercial best practices, the commercial 
sector could influence policymakers for the better.  
Although four policy options were presented, the solution may require pursuing 
more than one. Commercial best practices in the United States could influence regulators 
to establish better domestic policies. The United States could then use its leadership to set 
international norms, which then could influence the international space community to 
establish legally binding space debris mitigation measures. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
International and national regulators should consider commercial SSA systems as 
the primary source of SSA data for a space debris mitigation verification mechanism. SSA 
systems that are tied to military systems are generally constrained by transparency and 
data-sharing challenges. This is not to suggest that regulators ignore non-commercial SSA 
systems, but rather utilize commercial SSA data and services to promote transparency and 
data exchange. By using commercial SSA data and services as a primary mechanism, 
regulators would not be burdened by acquiring, maintaining, and operating expensive SSA 
systems. Canada’s privatized air traffic control and New Zealand’s partnership with 
LeoLabs may be viable models for such a public-private approach. 
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International and national regulators should formalize SSA requirements and data 
sharing. Furthermore, SSA systems should be separated by military, scientific, and civil 
taskings. For instance, the United States SSN should not be the SSA system for everyone. 
The United States military should focus on national defense and should not provide civil 
space services. It may be the right move to create a separate Unified Data Library (UDL) 
for DOD and the Open Architecture Data Repository (OADR) for OSC. By separating SSA 
this way, the military could focus on defense, the scientific community could focus on 
research, and regulatory regimes could focus on civil space matters. Although separating 
SSA systems by function could lead to stove-piping information, data sharing should still 
be highly encouraged. 
However, SSA systems are the technical answer to the orbital debris verification 
problem. Policy and organizational changes will also be needed to attain a verification 
regime that could enforce future legally-binding space debris mitigation policies. In 
September 2020, the authors of a white paper published by the Aerospace Corporation 
suggested two key action-items to enhance orbital debris mitigation. First, they argued that 
regulators should “establish definitions of nationally ‘acceptable’ thresholds for orbital 
debris and space safety consequences.”224 Second, they urged regulators to “organize and 
streamline the U.S. regulatory structure for debris mitigation.”225 Although the white paper 
was tailored for the United States, the concepts could be applied to other spacefaring 
countries and international regulators too. By adhering to these key actions, regulators 
could set the foundation needed to establish a space debris verification regime and more 
specific space debris mitigation rules. 
Once space situational awareness and space debris verification regimes are 
established, policymakers should develop legally binding space debris mitigation measures 
that result in improved compliance and, ultimately, long-term space sustainability. Both 
pre-launch and post-launch policies should be considered. In a 2020 journal article titled 
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“Space Governance in the New Space Era,” the authors propose “initiating efforts to reform 
and streamline existing licensing process for space launches” and “a ‘mission authorization 
process’...for commercial space applications and services not covered under existing 
licensing frameworks.”226 Regulators could also adopt commercial best practices, such as 
those presented by the Space Safety Coalition’s (SSC) “Best Practices for the Sustainability 
of Space Operations.” The SSC addresses information exchange, spacecraft design, and 
space operations concepts to attain space sustainability.227 For example, the SSC 
recommends that “spacecraft with limited observability should include features that 
enhance visibility (e.g., laser retro-reflectors and/or radar-cross-section enhancements).”228  
As for post-launch rules, space debris expert Darren McKnight proposed several 
policy recommendations during a presentation to the Department of Commerce’s Office of 
Space Commerce in August 2020. One example of a measure that should be considered 
would require that “satellites above 400 km have propulsive collision avoidance 
capability.”229 Another recommendation by McKnight advocates for a “5-year or 1-year 
standard for post-mission disposal” instead of the current 25-year guideline.230 If the United 
States were the first to establish such space debris mitigation measures, the United States 
could use its leadership in the space community to help set new norms for the international 
community.  
C. OPEN THE DOOR FOR SPACE TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT REFORM 
Space traffic management (STM) was not explicitly addressed because it is a 
separate problem set that warrants its own diligent research. The U.S. government defines 
STM as “the planning, coordination, and on-orbit synchronization of activities to enhance 
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the safety, stability, and sustainability of operations in the space environment” in SPD-3.231 
Of note, the definition of STM varies from institution to institution, and STM is not yet 
defined in other pertinent policy documents, such as the U.N.’s LTS guidelines nor the 
USG ODMSP. Be that as it may, space debris mitigation is part of the safety aspect of 
STM. Space debris mitigation and space traffic management also share similar political 
framework obstacles. The 2020 NAPA report determined that SSA is the precursor to 
performing STM.232 As such, this thesis lays the foundation of existing SSA technical 
infrastructures that could also support STM.  
In the journal article “A Practical Perspective on Space Traffic Management,” 
Darren McKnight, quoted earlier, outlines how space environment management (SEM), 
space situational awareness (SSA), and space traffic management (STM) interact with each 
other to achieve space operations assurance (SOA). SOA, a term proposed by McKnight, 
is the overarching domain that encompasses SEM, SSA, and STM, as shown in Figure 9.233 
SEM includes natural space hazards and debris mitigation efforts.234 SEM activities drive 
SSA requirements. Next, SSA focuses on both long-term (weeks to decades) issues, such 
as space debris remediation options and statistical collision risk, and mid-term (minutes to 
months) issues, such as space catalog maintenance and the discovery of newly created 
space objects.235 SSA is the primary source of information to STM. The third component, 
STM, has immediate and real-time needs (seconds to days), such as collision avoidance.236 
With this relationship between SSA and STM, the commercial SSA systems explored in 
this thesis could also support STM.  
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Figure 9. The interaction between SEM, SSA, and STM to achieve SOA237 
D. AREAS TO CONDUCT FURTHER RESEARCH 
There are several areas of future study that may be worth exploring. For example, 
a study on the successes, failures, and lessons learned from the New Zealand and LeoLabs 
partnership would be a relevant follow-up to this thesis. Another set of studies could look 
into commercial SSA services as a solution for other countries since this thesis only 
considered the United States in detail. This could help other spacefaring nations find an 
SSA solution that is more specific to their domestic regulations until policymakers come 
to a consensus on further international guidance. If the OADR comes into fruition, a case 
study should compare the OSC’s OADR and the DOD’s UDL. Additionally, such a study 
could also look into improving OSC’s civil STM framework. 
Another area of future work includes topics that will benefit the space community 
and regulators more directly. This thesis only covered major SSA systems, not all SSA 
systems that exist. Research that leads to a public database of SSA systems and data fusers 
could aid regulators and space operators in finding an SSA system that meets their needs 
more efficiently. Such a list should include basic sensor capabilities for each orbital regime, 
available services, and contact information. As for regulators, future work should define 
the consequences of violating legally binding space debris policies. More specifically, the 
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study could determine the monetary costs of debris-creating events then tie those costs to 
licensing, insurance, and penalties.  
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